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QUESTION FOR REVIEW 
Did the trial court and court of appeals err by 
concluding that the doctrine of collateral estoppel applied 
to this case? 
REFERENCE TO COURT 
OF APPEALS DECISION 
The opinion of the court of appeals is reported at 
758 P.2d 451 (Ct.App. 1988). A copy of the Slip Opinion is 
attached as Exhibit A. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The decision of the court of appeals was entered on 
July 8f 1988. A Petition for Rehearing was filed on July 21, 
1988. That petition was denied by the court of appeals on 
August 3, 1988. 
Jurisdiction of this court is conferred by Utah Code 
Ann., §78-2-2(5) (Amended 1986). 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
Not applicable. 
1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Trimble was a real estate broker- Monte Vista was a 
landowner. Fitzgerald was a land-buyer. Trimble introduced 
Monte Vista to Fitzgerald. Fitzgerald purchased land from 
Monte Vista. In schematic form, the relationships are as 
follows: 
In an earlier action, Trimble sued Fitzgerald for a 
real estate commission. The basis for that lawsuit was an 
earnest money agreement between Fitzgerald and Monte Vista. 
The earnest money agreement stated: "Buyer to be responsible 
for all real estate commissions." Trimble lost that trial 
and this court affirmed. See generally, Mel Trimble Real 
Estate v. Fitzgerald, 626 P.2d 453 (Ut. 1981) (copy attached 
as Exhibit B). 
After Trimble failed to collect a commission from 
Fitzgerald (buyer), Trimble sued Monte Vista (seller) for a 
2 
commission growing out of the same transaction. The basis 
for the second lawsuit was an (admitted) oral listing 
agreement wherein Monte Vista agreed to pay Trimble a six 
percent commission if the property was sold. See Mel Trimble 
Real Estate v. Fitzgerald, Id. at p. 453. This second 
lawsuit was dismissed on grounds of Collateral Estoppel. The 
court of appeals affirmed. (See Trimble v. Monte Vista 
Ranch, at pg. 9, Exhibit A.) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE TRIAL COURT AND THE 
COURT OF APPEALS WERE MISLED 
BY CONFUSING LANGUAGE IN THE UTAH 
SUPREME COURTfS PRIOR OPINION INVOLVING 
ONLY THE BUYER (FITZGERALD) AND THE BROKER (TRIMBLE) 
The first case (Mel Trimble Real Estate v. Fitz-
gerald) was an action by a broker (Trimble) against a buyer 
(Fitzgerald) for a real estate commission. The present case 
(Trimble v. Monte Vista Ranch) is a case by a broker 
(Trimble) against the seller (Monte Vista) for a real estate 
commission. Obviously, the parties are different and the 
issues are different. Thus, there can be no collateral 
estoppel. Mel Trimble Real Estate v. Monte Vista Ranch, Slip 
Opinion at p. 4 (Exhibit A). 
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The problem is that the trial court and the court of 
appeals were both misled by confusing language of this 
court's opinion. Specifically, this court approved the 
following language: 
. • .[T]he agreement of December 7, 1977, 
imposed upon defendant (Fitzgerald) the 
liability for the real estate commission, if 
any, owed plaintiff (Trimble) upon this 
transaction. •*-
In the case of Trimble v. Monte Vista (Exhibit A), 
the trial court construed that language to mean that neither 
Fitzgerald (buyer) nor Monte Vista (seller) owed Trimble a 
commission. Thus, the trial court stated: 
The issue at the first trial and the present 
issue are essentially the same, that is, 
whether a real estate commission was due 
(Trimble) from the sale of Monte Vista. . . 
and if so, who should pay that commission.^ 
The court of appeals accepted that strained inter-
pretation: 
From all that appears in the Supreme Court 
opinion,.the jury's judgment that Fitzgerald 
(buyer) did not owe a commission(sic) means 
1Mel Trimble Real Estate v. Fitzgerald, 526 P.2d at 455 
(Exhibit B). 
Exhibit C at p. 2. 
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that Trimble was not entitled to a commission 
at all. . .3 
In short, both the trial court and the court of 
appeals have interpreted this court's prior opinion to mean 
that Trimble was not entitled to a commission from either 
Fitzgerald (buyer) or Monte Vista (seller). 
Of course, that is an absurd result. That first 
lawsuit was an action by Trimble (broker) against Fitzgerald 
(buyer). The seller (Monte Vista) was simply not involved in 
Trimble's first lawsuit.4 Thusf there can be no collateral 
estoppel. 
POINT TWO 
CERTIORARI SHOULD BE GRANTED 
SO THAT THIS COURT CAN CLARIFY 
ITS OWN AMBIGUOUS DECISION 
This court's first decision was drafted by a very 
elderly retired judge. At best, the decision is obscure. 
The first trial was conducted solely on the theory of 
a third party beneficiary contract. That is, Trimble 
^Mel Trimble Real Estate v. Monte Vista Ranch, Slip 
Opinion at p. 5 (Exhibit A). 
qIn the first trial, Fitzgerald (buyer) cross-claimed 
against Monte Vista (seller) for unrelated matters. 
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(broker) claimed that he was a third party beneficiary to a 
contract between Fitzgerald (buyer) and Monte Vista (seller) 
The trial court refused to give the third party beneficiary 
instruction. This court affirmed. (See Exhibit B.) 
Inexplicably, this court failed to even analyze the 
third-party beneficiary issue. This court simply stated, 
without analysis: 
. . .[W]e think Instruction No. 8 fairly and 
adequately covered the contentions of the 
parties as they were presented to the court. 
We find no error in giving Instruction No. 8 
and in refusing to give appellant requested 
Instruction No. 23." 
626, P.2d at 455. 
The confusing nature of the opinion has misled the 
trial court and the court of appeals with respect to the 
issue of collateral estoppel in this subsequent lawsuit. If 
the confusion originated in this court, only this court can 
DThe earnest money contract between buyer and seller 
states: "Buyer to be responsible for all real estate 
commissions." See Mel Trimble Estate v. Fitzgerald, 626 P.2d 
at p. 454. 
°This court also ignored Trimble's argument that a 
third-party beneficiary contract is a two-party agreement; 
however, the literal wording of Instruction No. 8 requires a 
three-party agreement. (See Exhibit D, Appellant's Reply 
Brief, at p. 5.) 
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clarify the confusion. Certainly, Trimble should not suffer 
because of an ambiguous or confusing opinion. 
POINT THREE 
THE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED 
TO REVIEW ITS OWN RECORD BEFORE 
RULING ON THE ISSUE OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL 
The opinion of the court of appeals focused on what 
documents were available for the trial court to make its 
decision. The opinion infers that Trimble had a duty to 
locate or submit additional documents to the court. 
However, there was abundant evidence in the existing 
record to negate the collateral estoppel issue. The court of 
appeals simply failed to look at its own record and failed to 
evaluate Fitzgerald's citations to the record. 
Early in the litigation, Ohran (seller) made a motion 
to dismiss on the basis that Ohran (seller) was an indispen-
sable party in the original action. (R.17, R.20.)7 
Actually, that argument was simply a res judicata argument 
under a different name. (R.49, at Point III.) 
In any case, the relationships in the earlier case 
were explained to the trial judge in great detail. (R.39, 
(All citations to record included at Exhibit E.) 
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R.90.) Indeed, plaintiff's entire trial brief from the 
earlier trial was presented to the trial court. (R.49.) 
That document describes the relationships in graphic form. 
It is possible that the lower court judges might have 
been misled by an ambiguous opinion of this court. However, 
the parties were not misled! Monte Vista knows full well 
that it was not a party in the first lawsuit! It is a matter 
of extreme bad faith for Monte Vista to rely on an ambiguous 
opinion from this court. Monte Vista should have conceded 
that it was not a party in the first lawsuit. If certiorari 
is not granted, Monte Vista will simply profit from its own 
bad faith. 
DATED this ^ day of ^ef^h , 1988. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/ 
Appellant 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
s* /* , / 
I certify that on the Js day of j^JC 
1988, a true and correct copy of the foregoing PETITION FOR 
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EXHIBIT A 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OOOOO — 
Mel Trimble Real Estate, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Monte Vista Ranch, Inc. and 
Wallace Ohran, Ray E. Nelson, 
Howard D. Sherwood, et al., 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Before Judges Orme, Garff and Jacks 
ORME, Judge: 
In an earlier case, Mel Trimble Real Estate and its agent 
sued Leland Fitzgerald for a real estate sales commission 
allegedly owed. Trimble was unsuccessful in that action and 
the Utah Supreme Court affirmed in Mel Trimble Real Estate v. 
Fitzoerald, 626 P.2d 453 (Utah 1981). Trimble then brought 
this action to recover the commission against Monte Vista 
Ranch, Inc., which contracted to sell the property to 
Fitzgerald, and its shareholders. Monte Vista's motion for 
summary judgment was granted on res judicata grounds. Trimble 
appeals from the lower court's grant of the motion for summary 
judgment. We affirm. 
FACTS 
In 1977, Monte Vista's president, Wallace Ohran, engaged 
Trimble to sell Monte Vista's ranch property located in Cedar 
Valley, Utah. Ohran orally agreed that Monte Vista would pay 
Trimble a 6% sales commission. Trimble located a buyer, 
Fitzgerald, who negotiated with Monte Vista regarding the 
purchase price. Initially, Monte Vista offered to sell the 
ranch for $2,000,000 and to pay Trimble's commission. The 
final offer, to which Fitzgerald agreed, included a reduction 
in price to $1,875,000, on the condition that Fitzgerald would 
pay Trimble's commission. An earnest money agreement, which 
both Monte Vista and Fitzgerald signed, stated that the 
OPINION 
(For Publication) 
Case No. 86Q135-CA 
on. 
F I L E D 
aryT. Noonan 
Cleric of the Court 
Court of Appeats 
*[b]uyer [was] to be responsible for all real estate 
commissions." However, it did not specify how much Trimble was 
to be paid or the terms of payment. Trimble was not a party to 
the earnest money agreement. 
The ranch was Monte Vista's major asset and, for tax 
purposes, Fitzgerald ultimately agreed to a transfer of 
corporate stock instead of a transfer of the title to the 
property itself. Accordingly, Monte Vista's shareholders 
entered into a stock sale agreement with Fitzgerald. The stock 
sale agreement contained an integration clause which explicitly 
stated that this subsequent agreement "constitutes the entire 
agreement among the parties" and "supersedes all prior 
agreements." The stock sale agreement was silent on the issue 
of commissions. 
A dispute ensued as to whether Fitzgerald's earlier 
agreement to pay Trimble the commission was still in effect or 
whether it had been agreed instead that Trimble could buy part 
of the ranch on favorable terms in lieu of a commission. 
Trimble declined to purchase any part of the ranch and demanded 
a cash commission. Fitzgerald paid $5000 toward Trimble's 
commission but refused to pay more. Trimble then sued 
Fitzgerald on the ground that it was a third party beneficiary 
of the earnest money agreement. In that action, a jury 
concluded that Fitzgerald did not owe anything to Trimble and 
the trial court's decision based on the verdict was upheld by 
the Utah Supreme Court in Mel Trimble Real Estate v. 
Fitzgerald, 626 P.2d 453 (Utah 1981). 
Following the conclusion of the litigation against 
Fitzgerald, Trimble filed this suit against Monte Vista and its 
former shareholders alleging breach of contract and the right 
to recover the balance of the unpaid commission. The five 
named shareholders filed a motion to dismiss, which was 
denied. Monte Vista moved for summary judgment on a number of 
grounds, including res judicata and collateral estoppel, and 
attached to its supporting memorandum a copy of the Utah 
Supreme Court opinion affirming the judgment in the prior 
trial. The former shareholders joined in the motion. 
The entirety of Trimble's opposition to the summary 
judgment motion, insofar as premised on res judicata and 
collateral estoppel, consisted of a single paragraph disputing, 
in conclusory terms, Monte Vista's argument that the question 
of whether any commission was owed to Trimble had been 
litigated in the first action and decided adversely to 
Trimble. The district court granted the motion for summary 
judgment, albeit originally on only statute of limitations 
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grounds. For reasons which are not altogether clear, the 
resulting judgment was set aside. 
The motion for summary judgment, insofar as premised on 
other grounds, was then resubmitted. Additional memoranda were 
submitted and the motion orally argued, but Trimble offered no 
other information relative to the res judicata issue. The 
court issued a memorandum decision determining that the action 
was precluded on res judicata grounds. In making its decision, 
the court relied, as had the parties, exclusively on the 
Supreme Court1s reported decision in the earlier case. 
Trimble's appeal is premised on several grounds, which we 
regard as raising three points. First, even if it was 
appropriate for the district court to decide the res judicata 
question with reference only to the Supreme Court's opinion, it 
erred in finding in that opinion any basis for concluding that 
the commission issue raised in the present action had already 
been decided adversely to Trimble. Second, the district court 
should not have looked just to the opinion but should have 
scrutinized the pleadings and papers in the first action to see 
what issues were actually litigated and how they were decided. 
Third, this court should, in any event, take judicial notice of 
the pleadings and papers in the prior action in evaluating the 
propriety of the district court's decision in this case. 
Before turning to consider these issues, we pause briefly to 
review the doctrine of res judicata. 
I. RES JUDICATA AND COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL 
The doctrine of res judicata reflects the refusal of 
courts to tolerate pointless litigation and is based on the 
premise that the proper administration of justice is best 
served by limiting parties to one fair trial of an issue or 
cause. 46 Am.Jur.2d Judgments § 395 (1969). H[R]es judicata 
and collateral estoppel relieve parties of the cost and 
vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserve judicial resources, 
and, by preventing inconsistent decisions, encourage reliance 
on adjudication." Allen v. McCurrv, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980). 
The doctrine of res judicata has two separate but related 
branches which can be asserted as affirmative defenses. Penrod 
v. Nu Creation Creme, Inc., 669 P.2d 873, 874-75 (Utah 1983); 
Copper State Thrift & Loan v. Bruno, 735 P.2d 387, 389 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1987). The first branch, now known as claim 
preclusion but referred to previously as MpureM res judicata, 
bars the relitigation by the parties or their privies of a 
claim for relief previously resolved by a final judgment on the 
merits. Penrod v. Nu Creation Creme, Inc., 669 P.2d at 875. 
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See, e.g. , Braselton v. Clearfield State Bank, 606 F.2d 285, 
287 (10th Cir. 1979). "The same rule also prevents 
relitigation of claims that could and should have been 
litigated in the prior action but were not." Penrod v. Nu 
Creation Creme, Inc., 669 P.2d at 875. Under claim preclusion, 
the judgment is final and serves as the full measure for relief 
to be accorded between the same parties on the same claim or 
cause of action. 18 C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal 
Practice and Procedure § 4402 (1977). 
The second branch of res judicata is collateral estoppel, 
or issue preclusion. Under this doctrine, the relitigation of 
factual issues that have once been litigated and decided is 
precluded even if the claims for relief in the two actions are 
different, Penrod v. Nu Creation Creme, Inc., 669 P.2d at 875, 
and even if only "the party against whom the doctrine is 
asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the prior 
adjudication." Copper State Thrift & Loan v. Bruno, 735 P.2d 
at 390 (emphasis in original). This case turns on application 
of the collateral estoppel doctrine since Monte Vista and its 
shareholders were not parties to the prior action but, rather, 
contend the issue of whether any commission was owed had been 
litigated in that action and decided adversely to Trimble, who 
was a party to the prior action. 
In Searle Bros, v. Searle, 588 P.2d 689, 691 (Utah 
1978), the Utah Supreme Court outlined the following test to 
determine whether collateral estoppel applies: 
1) Was the issue decided in the prior 
adjudication identical with the one 
presented in the action in question? 
2) Was there a final judgment on the 
merits? 
3) Was the party against whom the plea is 
asserted a party or in privity with a 
party to the prior adjudication? 
4) Was the issue in the first case 
competently, fully, and fairly litigated? 
If all four elements of the test are satisfied, collateral 
estoppel bars relitigation of the same issue. In this case, 
Trimble, the party against whom the commission issue was 
allegedly decided, was a party to the prior action and that 
action resulted in a final judgment on the merits adverse to 
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Trimble. It remains to be seen whether the other two elements 
of the test were satisfied, i.e., whether the pertinent factual 
issue decided in the prior action is identical to the key issue 
in this case and whether it had been actually litigated. 
II. SUPREME COURT OPINION 
The district court premised its collateral estoppel 
conclusions strictly on the Supreme Court's opinion in the 
prior action. According to the opinion, the Supreme Court 
reviewed the trial transcript and determined that the litigants 
enjoyed a "fair and full trial, without prejudicial error." 
Mel Trimble Real Estate v. Fitzgerald, 626 P.2d at 455. 
Trimble's theory at trial was that Fitzgerald owed Trimble a 
monetary commission in the amount of $125,000.00. !£. at 454. 
According to the opinion, the trial court had occasion to 
determine "as a matter of law" that the "agreement . . . 
imposed upon [Fitzgerald] the liability for the real estate 
commission, if any, owed [Trimble] upon this transaction." Id. 
at 455. 
Trimble's contention on this appeal that the trial 
courtfs "as a matter of law" ruling was really not one or was 
entirely gratuitous, is simply not persuasive, at least when 
the opinion is considered by itself. It is surely appropriate 
to conclude the trial court would not have ruled that i_f any 
commission were owed it was owed by Fitzgerald, unless that 
question had been presented and litigated. From all that 
appears in the Supreme Court opinion, the iurv's judgment that 
Fitzgerald did not owe a commission means that Trimble was not 
entitled to a commission at all—and that collateral estoppel 
would properly bar this action to recover such a commission.1 
III. RECOURSE TO RECORD IN PRIOR ACTION 
Trimble argues, however, that the Supreme Court opinion 
is misleading and that the district court in the instant 
1. Trimble's decision not to join Monte Vista or its 
shareholders in the action it commenced against Fitzgerald 
tends to suggest Trimble knew* that, aside from whatever 
commissions other parties might owe, no commission was owed by 
Monte Vista or its shareholders. Where a party has a claim 
against one or more from among several parties, it is customary 
to join all of those parties in a single action and leave the 
factfinder to determine which of them actually is liable. That 
practice also saves "the parties and the judicial system 
considerable time and money." Serr v. Rick Jensen Constr., 
Inc., 743 P.2d 1202, 1204 (Utah 1987). 
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proceeding should not have decided the collateral estoppel 
question based solely on the opinion. Trimble contends that it 
is difficult to make a determination that the issue was 
actually litigated and decided from the four corners of the 
opinion. We tend to agree. Close examination of the record in 
a proceding may well lead to a conclusion somewhat at odds with 
the apparent "plain meaning" of a reported decision. See, 
e.g., Halladav v. Cluff. 739 P.2d 643 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
Trimble armies nn *ppp^] fhat- f^e rH sfrirt- nnnr^ in this case 
should have examined the record from the first proceeding's 
this examination would show that Trimble's second complaijit 
faisea new causes of action based on facts which had not -b^ en 
actually litigated and which did not depend for its success 6n 
any factual issues decided adversely to Trimble in tjig_jg£gpt 
action. 
The strongest support for Trimble's position is Parrish 
v. Lavton City Corp., 542 P.2d 1086 (Utah 1975)/ where the 
Court stated: "Since the record of the prior action was not 
before the trial court, there is no basis to sustain the 
determination that plaintiffs claim was barred by the doctrine 
of res judicata." .Id. at 1087. However, Parrish is readily 
distinguishable from the case at hand because the trial court 
in Parrish, without the record of the prior proceeding, had 
absolutely no basis for determining the res judicata issue.2 
2. Parrish was a 3-2 decision. It turned on a lack of 
compliance with rules of evidence and procedure "by which a 
judicial record may be proved." Parrish v. Layton City Corp., 
542 P.2d at 1087. The dissenters pointed out that, absent a 
transcript on appeal, the court should presume the judge had 
the appropriate records before him since appellant had the 
burden of proving otherwise. I£. at 1089 (Ellett, J., 
dissenting). Parrish was referred to in dicta in Searle Bros. 
v. Searle, 588 P.2d 689, 692 (Utah 1978), as support for the 
proposition that the trial court should not have decided the 
applicability of res judicata doctrines without independently 
examining the record of the prior litigation. Searle was also 
a 3-2 decision and, interestingly, the author of the Parrish 
majority opinion joined the dissent. 
We do not read Parrish and Searle as imposing an 
affirmative obligation on the court to independently consider 
the record in the prior litigation, regardless of the 
procedural posture in which a collateral estoppel issue arises 
and the position taken and tactics adopted by the resisting 
party. Such a requirement would be especially inappropriate in 
a case like this, where both parties1 handling of the summary 
judgment motion clearly suggested that the collateral estoppel 
question could be properly decided by reference to some other 
source, namely the reported Supreme Court opinion. 
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By contrast, in the instant case the Supreme Court opinion 
provides a basis upon which the district court could determine 
that collateral estoppel barred the instant action. 
As we see it, once Monte Vista submitted to the district 
court a copy of the Supreme Court opinion, which on its face 
showed that the key issue had been litigated and decided, the 
burden shifted to Trimble, if it believed more than the opinion 
was needed to make a fully informed decision, to produce the 
record of the prior proceeding, urge the court to take judicial 
notice of it, or otherwise show that the opinion should not be 
taken at face value. Instead, Trimble limited its resistance 
to arguing how the Supreme Court opinion should actually be 
construed and to the doctrinal requirements of collateral 
estoppel. An analogous situation is when an affidavit is 
submitted to the court in support of a motion for summary 
judgment. If the resisting party believes the affidavit is 
inaccurate or incomplete, that party may move to strike it or 
may submit a counteraffidavit. But if that party limits its 
response to arguing what the facts in movant's affidavit mean 
and to legal arguments, the court will rightly conclude that 
its disposition may properly turn on the affidavit which was 
submitted. The trial court in this case was likewise led to 
believe that the opinion was all that'it needed to decide the 
collateral estoppel aspect of the motion for summary judgment. 
Trimble's argument that the court should not have 
decided the motion without review of the record in the prior 
proceeding must additionally be rejected for the reason that 
that issue was never raised before the trial court and is 
raised for the first time on appeal, see, e.g., Zions First 
Nat'l Bank v. National Am. Title Ins. Co., 749 P.2d 651, 657 
(Utah 1988), an issue revisited in the next section. 
IV. JUDICIAL NOTICE 
Finally, Trimble argues that the rule on judicial notice 
permits—or even requires—this court to take notice of the 
record in the first proceeding and to evaluate the district 
court's decision in light of what the record actually shows. 
This issue is a difficult one, as Utah R. Evid. 201 does not 
explicitly allow or prohibit the taking of judicial notice for 
the first time on appeal. 
860135-CA 7 
Rule 201, which governs judicial notice of adjudicative 
facts,3 provides in subsection (c) that -[a] court may take 
judicial notice, whether requested or not." However, under 
subsection (d) a court is required to "take judicial notice if 
requested by a party and supplied with the necessary 
information." Moreover, the rule specifically provides in 
subsection (f) that M[j]udicial notice may be taken at any 
stage of the proceeding." 
Trimble argues that since it has requested this court to 
take notice of the proceeding and has supplied us with the 
-necessary information," we are obligated to take judicial 
notice since notice may be taken at "any stage of the 
proceeding," This argument is plausible, see 21 C. Wright & 
K. Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure § 5110 at 525 (1977), 
but creates a dilemma. "Where the issue of judicial notice is 
raised for the first time on appeal, the appellate court is 
faced with a conflict between the policy that decisions ought 
not to run contrary to indisputable facts and the procedural 
policy that prohibits a party from raising issues on appeal 
that were not raised below." 1&. See People v. Bush, 37 Cal. 
App.3d 952, 112 Cal. Rptr. 770 (1974) (under California 
Evidence Code § 459, court cannot take notice for first time on 
appeal of a matter not noticed below in order to permit a party 
to assert a legal theory not presented to the trial court). 
See also Zions First Nat'l Bank v. National Am. Title Ins. Co., 
749 P.2d at 657. 
We agree that the better interpretation limits mandatory 
judicial notice to the trial court. See 21 C. Wright & K. 
Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure § 5110 at 525 (1977). 
See also Holbrook v. Carter, 19 Utah 2d 288, 431 P.2d 123, 125 
(1967). It remains to be decided whether we should take 
judicial notice of the record in the prior proceeding for the 
first time, as a matter of discretion. 
For us to take notice of the record in the first 
proceeding would permit the concept of judicial notice to be 
used to get around the rule precluding raising issues for the 
first time on appeal. Utah courts have consistently followed a 
policy strongly opposed to the raising of issues for the first 
3. This rule is the federal rule, verbatim. See Advisory 
Committee Note, Utah R. Evid. 201. The rule "'governs only 
judicial notice of adjudicative facts,1 and does not deal with 
instances in which a court may notice legislative facts, which 
is left to the sound discretion of trial and appellate 
courts." id. See Utah R. Evid. 201(a). 
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time on appeal. See, e.g., Zions First Nat'l Bank v. National 
Am. Title Ins. Co., 749 P.2d 651, 654 (Utah 1988) (rule applies 
even where facts are not disputed and issue raised is one of 
law); Banaerter v. Poulton. 663 P.2d 100, 102 (Utah 1983); 
James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
Ebbert v. Ebbert, 744 P,2d 1019, 1023 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
There are only very limited exceptions to that sound policy. 
One such exception allows an appellate court to affirm trial 
court decisions on proper grounds other than those which the 
trial court cited in making its decision. Buehner Block Co. v. 
UWC Assocs., 752 P.2d 892, 894-95 (Utah 1988).4 Another 
limited exception exists when to do otherwise would permit 
deviation from a legislative scheme. Cox Rock Products v. 
Walker Pipeline Constr., 754 P.2d 672, 676 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988). We see no compelling "countervailing principle" to be 
served by making an exception in this case, see id., even 
though under Rule 201 we would have the power to take judicial 
notice for the first time and, indeed, might do so in an 
appropriate case. See Note 4, supra. We therefore decline to 
take notice of the record in the prior proceeding for the 
purpose of looking behind the Supreme Court's opinion and 
evaluating the district court's decision in light of 
information not presented to it. 
CONCLUSION 
A plain reading of the Supreme Court's opinion in the 
earlier case shows that Trimble's claim to any commission has 
already been litigated and decided adversely to Trimble* Since 
the parties all but conceded that the opinion alone would 
permit the district court to make an informed decision on the 
applicability of collateral estoppel, the trial court did not 
err in failing to review the record of the prior proceeding on 
its own motion. It is not mandatory that we take notice of the 
record in that proceeding for the first time on appeal, and we 
decline to do so as a matter of discretion in view of the 
strong policy in this state against consideration of arguments 
4. Under Buehner Block, it might be appropriate to take notice 
for the first time on appeal if doing so would permit 
affirmance. Cf. 21 C. Wright & K. Graham, Federal Practice and 
Procedure § 5110 at 525 (1977) ("most facts that are noticed 
for the first time on appeal will undoubtedly be noticed in 
order to avoid a reversal"). However, we are asked here to 
notice matters not raised before the trial court for the 
purpose of reversing the trial court. 
860135-CA 9 
and issues for the first time on appeal. The judgment appealed 
from is accordingly affirmed. 
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EXHIBIT B 
MEL TRIMBLE REAL ESTATE v. FITZGERALD 
Cite as, Utah, 626 P.2d 453 
3. Brokers 
MEL TRIMBLE REAL ESTATE, and 
Cal Florence, Plaintiffs and 
Appellants, 
Utah 453 
v. 
Leland A. FITZGERALD, Defendant 
and Respondent. 
No. 16746. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Feb. 13, 1981. 
Broker and sales agent brought action 
against purchaser for real estate sales com-
mission. The Third District Court, Salt 
Lake County, Bryant H. Croft, J., entered 
judgment in favor of purchaser, and plain-
tiffs appealed. The Supreme Court, Har-
ding, District Judge, held that: (1) in case 
in which earnest money agreement between 
vendor and purchaser provided "Buyer to 
be responsible for all real estate commis-
sions," instruction given by the court fairly 
and adequately covered the contentions of 
the parties as they were presented to the 
court, and there was no error in refusing to 
give requested instruction on theory that 
broker was a third-party beneficiary in ear-
nest money agreement, and (2) issues as to 
sales commission claimed by broker and 
whether there should have been any sales 
commission at all were for the jury. 
Affirmed. 
1. Contracts <s=>187(l) 
It is essential for a third-party benefi-
ciary claimant to prove that contract was 
intended to benefit him directly; one inci-
dentally benefited by performance of a 
promise to a third person may not maintain 
an action against the promissor. 
2. Contracts <&=>187(1) 
Terms of agreement and facts circum-
stances that surround its making can be 
examined to determine whether supposed 
third-party beneficiary of contract was in 
fact intended to be such. 
88(7) 
In action against purchaser for real 
estate sales commission in case in which 
earnest money agreement between vendor 
and purchaser provided "Buyer to be re-
sponsible for all real estate commissions," 
instruction given by the court fairly and 
adequately covered the contentions of the 
parties as they were presented to the court, 
and there was no error in refusing to give 
requested instruction on theory that broker 
was a third-party beneficiary in earnest 
money agreement. 
4. Brokers <s=>88(l) 
In action by broker and sales agent 
against purchaser for real estate sales com-
mission, issues as to sales commission 
claimed by broker and whether there should 
be any sales commission at all were for the 
jury. 
Robert J. DeBry and Dale F. Gardiner, 
Salt Lake City, for plaintiffs and appel-
lants. 
Lawrence E. Corbridge, Salt Lake City, 
for defendant and respondent. 
HARDING, District Judge: 
This appeal is from an adverse judgment 
on a claim for a real estate sales commis-
sion. 
Appellants were in the business of selling 
real estate. Mel Trimble was a licensed 
real estate broker, and Cal Florence was 
employed by Trimble as a sales agent. The 
appellants will be referred to herein jointly 
as Florence. 
The ranch property involved in this action 
is located in Cedar Valley, Utah, and was 
under the management and control of Wal-
lace Ohran. Respondent Leland A. Fitzger-
ald was a rancher. 
Two or three years prior to December, 
1977, Florence allegedly obtained an oral 
listing from Ohran to sell the ranch proper-
ty. The terms of the oral listing allowed 
Florence to seek offers, and if any offer 
was accepted by Ohran, a six percent com-
mission would be paid on the sale. 
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In (MOIMT, 11)77, through the efforts of 
Florence, Fitzgerald became interested in a 
part of the ranch and an offer was made to 
Ohran. The offer was unacceptable to Oh-
ran. About December 1, 1977, there was a 
meeting of Ohran, Fitzgerald and Florence 
in which Ohran told Fitzgerald he would 
sell the ranch for $2,000,000, and that he 
would pay the sales commission of six per-
cent from the proceeds of the sale. During 
the course of their discussion, Ohran said 
that he would reduce the sale price of the 
ranch to $1,875,000 if Fitzgerald would pay 
the commission. Fitzgerald agreed to this 
proposal. Nothing was put in writing at 
this time. 
On December 7, 1977, Ohran, Fitzgerald, 
Florence and other interested persons met 
in American Fork, Utah, in an effort to 
effect a final sales agreement and to reduce 
it to writing. Up to this time, there had 
been no binding contract for a real estate 
listing, a sales commission, nor for the sale 
of any property. At this meeting, further 
discussions ensued. A sales commission for 
$125,000 to Florence was mentioned. Flor-
ence asked that there be two earnest money 
agreements: one for Fitzgerald's part of 
the ranch, and the other for Florence's part 
of the ranch. Ohran said there would have 
to be one entire sale. Fitzgerald and Flor-
ence retired to another room to discuss the 
matter between themselves. The testimony 
is conflicting as to what was discussed at 
this private conference. About one-half 
hour later, when they rejoined the others, 
Fitzgerald said that he would take title to 
the property and would take care of Flor-
ence. 
Thereupon, an earnest money agreement 
was made and executed between Monte 
Vista Ranch, Inc. (Ohran's principal) and 
Fitzgerald for the sale of the ranch for 
$1,875,000. The agreement had a provision 
stating, "Buyer to be responsible for all real 
estate commissions." No further particu-
lars were discussed at the meeting nor stat-
ed in the earnest money agreement with 
respect to a real estate sales commission. 
I*ilcr that evening, Fitzgerald and Flor-
ence had a discussion concerning the pur-
chase that had been made of the ranch, but 
their testimony is conflicting as to any de-
termination. However, Fitzgerald did give 
Florence a check for $5,000. Their testimo-
ny is in conflict as to what the check was 
for 
On August 7, 1978, appellant filed a com-
plaint, alleging that he and Fitzgerald had 
jointly purchased the assets of the Monte 
Vista Ranch, Inc., that he was entitled to an 
accounting, and demanded judgment for his 
share of the assets. The theory upon which 
the original complaint was based was later 
abandoned, and an amended complaint was 
filed praying for a sales commission in mon-
ey only of $125,000. The case went to trial 
with a jury on the latter theory. A verdict 
against appellant was returned, upon which 
judgment was entered. The court denied 
appellant's motions for judgment notwith-
standing the verdict and for a new trial 
[1,2] Appellant contends that the court 
erred in failing to give a requested instruc-
tion, No. 23, on the specific theory that he 
was a third-party beneficiary in the earnest 
money agreement between the seller and 
Fitzgerald, the buyer of the ranch property. 
In this regard, it is essential for a third-par-
ty beneficiary claimant to prove that the 
contract was intended to benefit him direct-
ly. One incidently benefited by the per-
formance of a promise to a third person 
may not maintain an action against the 
promisor. The terms of the agreement and 
the facts and circumstances that surround-
ed its making can be examined to deter-
mine whether the supposed beneficiary was 
in fact intended to be such.1 
The court gave Instruction No. 8, to 
which appellant excepted. The portions of 
this instruction relevant here are as folio*** 
The controversy centers around an ear-
nest money receipt and offer to purchase 
agreement dated December 7, 1977, by 
which the corporate owner of the ranch 
agreed to sell it to defendant for the 
price stated therein. Among other 
1. Kelly v. Richards, 95 Utah 560, 83 P.2d 731 
(1938); 129 A.L.R. 164. 
WAITERS y 
Cite as, Utah, 
things, this agreement contained a provi-
sion that defendant, Laland [sic] A. Fitz-
gerald, as buyer was to be responsible for 
all real estate commissions.... 
. . . the court has ruled as a matter of 
law that the agreement of December 7, 
1977, imposed upon defendant the liabili-
ty for the real estate commission, if any, 
owed plaintiffs upon this transaction. 
Normally, the amount of any such com-
mission would have been as fixed by 
agreement between the real estate sales-
man and the parties to the earnest money 
agreement and should your determination 
from the evidence be that in this case 
such was done and agreed to at the time 
of the execution of that agreement, no 
one could unilaterally change the agree-
ment, and you should return your verdict 
accordingly; but should your determina-
tion be that while defendant agreed with 
the seller to be responsible for all real 
estate commissions at the time the agree-
ment was signed, but that at that time 
Cal Florence and Leland Fitzgerald were 
still negotiating with each other with re-
spect to the nature of the transaction as 
between themselves and how and in what 
manner and in what amount any such 
commission was to be paid, you are in-
structed that they could between them-
selves make an agreement thereon by 
which each would be bound irrespective 
of the intent or belief of the seller, and 
once such agreement was made, neither 
could change that agreement without the 
consent of the other. 
Thus, it is your responsibility to deter-
mine from the evidence what amount, if 
any, is owed by defendant to plaintiffs. 
The burden is upon the plaintiffs to prove 
by a preponderance of the evidence the 
basis for, and the amount of, their claim. 
[3] After reading the transcript of the 
trial proceedings, including the testimony of 
the witnesses, and considering the theories 
of the parties and the applicable law, we 
think Instruction No. 8 fairly and adequate-
ly covered the contentions of the parties as 
they were presented to the court. We find 
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no error in giving Instruction No. 8, and in 
refusing to give appellants' requested In-
struction No. 23. 
[4] Appellants' assertion of error in fail-
ing to direct a verdict of liability against 
the defendant is without merit, since there 
were sharp conflicts in the testimony on the 
issue of the sales commission claimed by 
Florence, or whether there should have 
been a sales commission at all. 
The record shows that the verdict of the 
jury was based on competent, relevant, and 
admissible evidence; that the trial judge 
supported the verdict by his denial of appel-
lants' motions for judgment notwithstand-
ing the verdict and for a new trial; and 
that he accorded to the litigants a fair and 
full trial, without prejudicial error. 
Affirmed. Costs to respondents. 
HALL, STEWART and CROCKETT,* 
JJ., and HENRIOD, Retired Justice, concur. 
MAUGHAN, C. J., and HOWE, J., do not 
participate herein. 
HENRIOD, Retired Justice, and HAR-
DING, Retired District Judge, sat. 
O | ^NUMBERSYSTEM> 
Lisa WATTERS, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Clayton N. QUERRY, Jean C. Querry, 
Charles L Querry, Elizabeth Heming-
way, and David E. Hemingway, Defend-
ants and Respondents. 
No. 16897. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Feb. 17, 1981. 
Plaintiff sued defendant, whose car 
had rear-ended plaintiffs, and codefendant, 
* CROCKETT, J., concurred in this case before 
his retirement, January 5, 1981. 
EXHIBIT C 
FOURTH JMLViil P'STK^.: r/Aifcl 
OF UT^h ; ::sT •.•iUT: ;^f I.'IAH 
MEL TRIMBLE REAL ESTATE 
JUN -k PM $ k3 
In the Fourth Judicial District Qm\*lLL'^™;™„ 
of the State of Utah 
In and For Utah County 
PUinttff 
MONTE VISTA RANCH, I N C . , A UTAH 
CORPORATION, WALLACE D. OHRAN, 
RAY E. NELSON, HOWARD D. SHERWOOD1 
JOYCE T . RICE AND NELDON Defendant 
WILLIAMS 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASENUMBER 60,784 
DATED June 3, 1985 
David Sam JUDGE 
This case is before the court on Defendants' Motion to 
Dismiss and is considered pursuant to Rule 2.8, Rules of Practice 
of the District Courts. 
R U L I N G 
When examined under the doctrine of res judicata, it is apparent 
the case at bar rests on the same state of facts and evidence of the 
same character as were presented in Mel Trimble Real Estate et al v. 
Leland A. Fitzgerald, Civil No. C-78-4944. The trial court in that 
case, after hearing the witnesses who would appear and viewing the 
documents that would be introduced in this suit, ruled as a matter 
of law, that Fitzgerald was solely liable for any real estate com-
mission that may have been owed Florence. The jury sitting in that 
action was so instructed after the court explicitly rejected an in-
struction related to third party beneficiary contracts. Undoubtedly 
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he precise issue at bar was fully and finally litigated in the 
our day trial which resulted in a verdict that no commission was 
ue Florence. On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court upheld the 
ecision finding no error in the trial court's ruling or instruction. 
lei Trimble Real Estate v. Fitzgerald, 626 P.2d 453 (1981). This 
:ourt clearly lacks jurisdiction to review the application of law 
)r findings of fact in that case and consequently lacks jurisdiction 
to relitigate the issue of liability for the alleged commission. 
Therefore, the instant action is barred under the doctrine of res 
judicata. 
Moreover, even if this suit could be characterized as arising 
from a cause of action different from that previously tried, it is 
barred under the doctrine of collateral estoppel as adopted by the 
Utah Supreme Court in Schaer v. State of Utah, 657 P.2d 1337, 1340, 
1341 (1983). Clearly, the "issue decided in the prior adjudication 
was identical with the one presented in th[is] action. . . ." Id.at 
1340. Xhe--isrQ€SFa.t'-''t"fi"e^fir"st trial and the present issue are 
essejT^jy.lx.the:rs^mejrJ^^Jli.s» whether a real estate commission was 
due Florence fronr the-~sale"of Monte Vista Ranch, Inc. (Monte Vista), 
and^rf^rs'o"7r'who' shoald^pay the..commissi on./ The record shows that 
defendant Ohran testified at that trial and was present for cross 
examination, and that evidence of the event surrounding the trans-
action was fully presented. This court is unaware of any occurence 
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subsequent to the previous trial or appeal that would lead to the 
introduction of evidence not fully considered in the previous action. 
Secondly, the previous case was "decided on its merits." j_d_. 
at 1341. Although the Utah Supreme Court was unable to determine 
from the record the exact nature of the dealings between Florence 
and Fitzgerald,, the court noted several facts that cast serious doubt 
on whether any money that passed or would have passed between them 
should be characterized as a commission. Apparently, even after 
defendant Ohran, as seller, reduced the sales price offered by the 
amount of the claimed commission (upon Fitzgerald's agreement to 
pay it), Fitzgerald and plaintiff Florence were still negotiating 
as to their possible joint purchase of the assets of Monte Vista. 
Irrespective of the actual agreement that emerged between Fitzgerald 
and Florence, this court is persuaded, as were the courts hearing the 
previous action, that liability for the commission cannot be imputed 
to the defendant Ohran. 
Thirdly, there can be no serious claim that the issue in the 
first case was not "competently, fully, and fairly litigated." _I_d. 
As stated above, the Utah Supreme Court found no reversible errors 
in the previous jury trial that lasted four days and included 
testimony from and opportunity to cross examine all the witnesses 
relevant to this action. Finally, the Utah Supreme Court has 
abandoned the rule requiring mutuality of the parties in a collateral 
PAGE FOUR 
# 60,734 
estoppel case. "The established rule is that a stranger to a 
judgment may assert a judgment against one who actually litigated 
an issue that was necessarily decided by the judgment and thereby 
preclude the relitigation of the same issue." Searle v. Searle, 
588 P.2d 689 (Utah 1 9 7 8 ) . The exception to the requirement of 
mutuality is particularly just in the case at bar where defendant 
Ohran seeks to use the prior judgment as a shield to avoid liability 
in this suit because his alleged liability would depend on fact and 
law previously determined and applied. Therefore, even if this suit 
could be treated as arising from a cause of action different from 
that underlying the previous action, plaintiff is barred, under the 
doctrine of collateral estoppel, from bringing its claim against 
defendants. 
Based upon the foregoing, it is clear to this court that 
plaintiff is barred from bringing this action against the instant 
defendants. 
Accordingly, defendants' Motion to Dismiss is granted, and 
plaintiff's complaint is dismissed with prejudice. Costs to 
defendants. 
>ated this _ J ^ £ y J u n e , 1985 
rt^r^v ^z±r=rrriL 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
cc: Robert B. Hansen 
EXHIBIT D 
SUPPLEMENTAL FACTS 
Plaintiff brought this action against Monte Vista 
Ranch, Inc. and its former shareholders to collect a real 
estate commission (R. 1-4). The shareholders sold the 
corporation's assets (consisting mainly of real property) to 
Leland Fitzgerald by selling their stock in Monte Vista (R. 
182-195). Plaintiff procured the sale (R. 152) . The 
Earnest Money Agreement between Monte Vista and its former 
shareholders and Leland Fitzgerald required Fitzgerald to 
pay plaintiff's real estate commission (R. 152). In a prior 
action, plaintiff sued Fitzgerald for his commission. 
Plaintiff first alleged that he had some kind of a joint 
purchase agreement with Fitzgerald (R. 153, 253). Plaintiff 
later amended that pleading to simply sue for a commission 
(R. 153) . 
Plaintiff lost the prior action against 
Fitzgerald. The record does not show what Fitzgerald's 
specific defense to plaintiff's claims was (R. 253). The 
trial court in this case acknowledged that the basis of the 
decision against plaintiff on his claim against Fitzgerald 
was unclear (Id.) 
In its memorandum decision, the trial court refers 
to Wallace Ohran. Mr. Ohran was Monte Vista's president and 
a major shareholder before the sale to Fitzgerald. The 
other individual defendants are Monte Vista's other former 
shareholders (R. 182-195). Neither Monte Vista Ranch, Inc. 
nor its former shareholders were sued by plaintiff in the 
prior action (R. 17). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendants did not introduce any evidence of what 
:he prior case was all about. They relied solely on the 
reported appellate decision of the prior case. That deci-
sion does not reveal what the underlying issues really were 
.n the prior case. Thus, defendants did not meet their 
>urden of showing that no material issue of fact on the res 
udicata and collateral estoppel claims. The trial court 
elied upon defendants' incomplete submission and reached 
he wrong result. 
The determination that the trial court erred can 
e made from the materials of record in this case. 
The State of Frauds does not preclude recovery 
scause Ohran admitted the existence of plaintiff's contract 
n court and because the "contract was fully performed, 
iditionally, the sale ultimately became a sale of stock to 
lich the Statute of Frauds does not apply rather than a 
lie of real property. 
POINT I 
THE RECORD IN THIS CASE DEMONSTRATES 
THAT THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING WAS 
BASED UPON AN INCORRECT ASSUMPTION 
Defendants admitted plaintiff did not file any 
mplaint against Monte Vista Ranch or its former sharehold-
s in the prior action (R. 17) . Defendants admitted that 
2 
Fitzgerald filed a third-party complaint against Monte 
Vista's former shareholders IR. 17). Fitzgerald's 
third-party complaint in the prior action was for indemnifi-
cation from Monte Vista's former shareholders if plaintiff 
recovered from Fitzgerald (R. 17). 
The issues in Fitzgerald's third-party indemnifi-
cation suit were completely different than the issues 
plaintiff asserted against Fitzgerald. (See plaintiff's 
original brief, pp. 14-16). The indemnification suit was 
based upon language in the stock purchase agreement between 
Fitzgerald and Monte Vista's former shareholders to the 
effect that each party would reimburse the other for any 
liability for commissions (R. 189). Such an arrangement was 
circular. Under those terms, ultimate payment would depend 
on whom plaintiff sued first. But the Earnest Money Agree-
ment between Fitzgerald and Monte Vista's former sharehold-
ers clearly stated that as between Monte Vista's former 
shareholders and Fitzgerald, Fitzgerald would be responsible 
(R. 152). Thus, the court in the prior action ruled that 
Fitzgerald would be liable to plaintiff (R. 155). 
This ruling was referred to in a jury instruction 
(R. 155) . Both in its ruling on res judicata and in its 
ruling on collateral estoppel, the trial court assumed that 
one result of the prior action was that "the courts hearing 
the previous action" were persuaded " that liability for the 
commission cannot be imputed to the defendant Ohran" (R. 
51-254, quoting from 253). A copy of the trail court's 
rder is attached as Exhibit "A". 
As against plaintiff, the courts in the prior 
ction could not and did not make that determination because 
laintiff did not bring any claim against Monte Vista or its 
hareholders in that prior action (R. 17) . The trial 
ourt's ruling was based upon an assumption that was clearly 
rroneous. 
POINT II 
THE RECORD IN THIS CASE DEMONSTRATES THAT 
THE COURT DID NOT HAVE ANY ADEQUATE RECORD 
OF THE PRIOR CASE BEFORE IT 
Defendant argues that the rule that the court must 
ndependently examine the record of a prior case before 
aking a res judicata or collateral estoppel ruling is not 
pplicable because there was a reported appellate decision 
f the case against Fitzgerald. Defendants did not cite any 
Jthority for their argument. Further, collateral estoppel 
id res judicata require a showing that the issues in the 
trior case and the pending one are the same. Searle Bros. 
. Searlef 588 P.2d 689 (Utah 1978). Even if defendants 
Duld rely on a reported decision, any such opinion would 
ave to be complete enough to make that determination. It 
5 not enough to just show plaintiff lost. 
The record in this case demonstrates that the 
sported decision, Mel Trimble Real Estate v. Fitzgerald, 
16 P.2d 453 (Utah 1981), was not complete enough to make a 
roper determination of collateral estoppel. The reported 
decision mentioned plaintiff1s contention that the verdict 
should have been directed in his favor. But the court 
disposed of that argument without specifying what the actual 
claims of the parties were. The majority of the reported 
decision simply dealt with the adequacy of a jury instruc-
tion. The appellate decision did not go into significant 
detail on specific allegations or specific conclusions. 
The trial court admitted in its memorandum deci-
sion that it did not know what the actual arrangement was 
between plaintiff and Fitzgerald: 
Although the Utah Supreme was unable to 
determine from the record the exact 
nature of the dealings between Florence 
and Fitzgerald, the court noted several 
facts that cast serious doubt on 
whether any money that passed or would 
have passed between them should be 
characterized as a commission (upon 
Fitzgerald1s agreement to pay it), 
Fitzgerald and plaintiff Florence were 
still negotiating as to their possible 
joint purchase of the assets of Monte 
Vista. 
(R. 253). 
After expressing this uncertainty, the trial court 
clearly showed that its decision on collateral estoppel as 
well as res judicata was based on its assumption that the 
court made a determination that Monte Vista1s former share-
holders did not owe anybody (including plaintiff) anything: 
Irrespective of the actual agreement 
that emerged between Fitzgerald and 
Florence, this court is persuaded, as 
were the courts hearing tY\^ previous 
action, that liability for th<* commis-
sion cannot be imputed to the defendant 
Qhran" [Monte Vista!s former sharehold-
er J . 
(R. 253). 
As we have shown, that conclusion was wrong, 
Defendants admitted plaintiff did not bring an action 
against Monte Vista or its former shareholder in the prior 
action (R. 17). Thus determination that Monte Vista and its 
former shareholders owed nothing to plaintiff could not 
possibly have been made. 
POINT III 
DEFENDANTS DID NOT MEET THEIR 
BURDEN OF PROOF 
Defendants argue that plaintiff is, nevertheless, 
collaterally estopped from asserting any claims against 
yionte Vista or its former shareholders because the prior 
action at least determined that Fitzgerald did not owe 
plaintiff anything. But, before collateral estoppel could 
aPP^Yf w^ would need to know why the prior court made that 
iecision. We would need to know what the precise issues 
tfere. Schear v. State, 657 P.2d 689 (Utah 1983). 
The fact that plaintiff did the work which pro-
cured the sale is not disputed. The Earnest Money Agreement 
establishes that fact by specifying that plaintiff's commis-
sion should be taken care of (R. 152) . The record also 
establishes that plaintiff was only paid $5,000 (R. 154) on 
tfhat was at least a $1,400,000 sale (R. 185). 
By specifying that plaintiff's real estate commis-
sion was to be paid, defendants acknowledged plaintiff 
procured the sale and earned a commission of some kind (R. 
152) . The record also contains a six page transcript from 
Wallace Chran's deposition in the prior case (R. 81-87), a 
copy of which is attached as Exhibit "B" hereto). In that 
transcript, Ohran admits that the shareholders at one time 
agreed to pay plaintiff a 6% commission (R. 81) . 
The trial court did not understand the basis for 
the decision in the prior case (R. 25 3). We have shown that 
it could not have been based on failure to perform, or 
payment which would be the usual reasons. The record in 
this case shows that plaintiff and Fitzgerald were negotiat-
ing some kind of a joint purchase of the subject property 
that never took place (R. 146-147, 154, 253). 
It was defendants1 burden to show that collateral 
estoppel applies. Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
FMA Acceptance Co. v. Leatherbv Ins. Co., 594 P.2d 1332 
(Utah 1979) . Mere assertions that no genuine fact question 
exists are no more valid than mere assertions that a fact 
question exists. See Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170 (Utah 
1983). 
For collateral estoppel to apply, defendants would 
have to show what the precise issues in the prior case 
were — not just that plaintiff lost. Defendants did not 
introduce any evidence on what the underlying contentions 
and facts were in the prior case and relied solely on the 
incomplete reported decision. (See plaintiff's original 
brief, pp.11-14). Defendants did not meet their burden. 
After reviewing defendants1 authorities, plaintiff 
acknowledges that defendants are probably right when they 
:gue the material not in the record (Exhibits C and D to 
Laintiffs brief in chief) cannot be considered on appeal, 
it the trial court erred by ruling without considering 
imilar material. The record in this case demonstrates that 
efendants did not meet their burden of showing that no 
aterial fact issue exits concerning the application of res 
udicata or collateral estoppel. The court does not have to 
onsider materials not in the record to make that determina-
\ on . 
VMM NT IV 
Till* STATUTE OF FRAUDS DOES NOT APPLY BECAUSE 
OHRAN ADMITTED THE EXISTENCE OF A CONTRACT 
The trial court properly refused to base its 
ecision on the Statute of Frauds (R. 251-254) . An admis-
ion in pleadings, depositions, or in open court satisfies 
he Statute of Frauds. Bentlev v. Potter, 694 P.2d 617 
— 
Utah 1984). Defendants admitted that a contract existed. 
Ohran admitted on page 528, lines 10-14 of the 
rior cases1 transcript that Monte Vista's shareholder's 
greed to pay plaintiff a 6% commission. The relevant 
estimony came in as follows: 
Q: (By Mr. DeBry) The question was: "Tell me, 
to the best of your recollection, what was 
said during this conversation." And do you 
recall at that time that you testified: "I 
told Mr. Florence that we would agree to sell 
the property to his buyers and to pay him a 
six percent commission." Was that your 
testimony at this time we gave the deposi-
tion? 
A: (By Wallace Ohran) That was my testimony, 
that is right. (R. 234-235). 
Defendants assert that this admission is not 
sufficient because the term "we" allegedly does not identify 
the promisors. In context, however, it clearly refers to 
Monte Vista and its former shareholders. Moreover, it is 
well established that ambiguities in the materials used to 
satisfy the Statute of Frauds can be resolved by parol 
evidence. Johnson v. Allen, 158 P.2d 134 (Utah 1945); 
Johnson v. Ogle, 181 P.2d 789 (Mont. 19 ) ; 72 Am Jur.2d 
"Statute of Frauds" §296. This includes the identity of a 
party. 72 Am Jur.2d "Statute of Frauds" §297 n.45, n.46. 
Defendants further protest on the grounds that 
plaintiff merely referred the court to the admission and did 
not set it out fully for the trial court. But defendants 
themselves set the quote out fully in their own memorandum 
to the trial court (R. 234-235) . They did not assert that 
plaintiff's citation was wrong or argue that plaintiff 
needed to do more to place the issue before the court. 
(Id.). The matter was presented to the trial court with 
defendants' approval as to the form of submission. They 
cannot complain now. Board of Education of Salt Lake City 
v. Bothwell & Swanor, 400 P.2d 568 (Ut. 1965).l 
Additionally, the contention that plaintiff 
should have borne the burden of setting forth the actual 
testimony is raised from the first time on appeal. Even if 
there were merit to this argument, it should not be 
considered for that reason alone. Edaar v. Waaner, 572 P.2d 
405 (Utah 1977). ' ' 
Defendants also ignore other writings and admis-
sions. Admittedly, the phrase in the Earnest Money Agree-
ment that makes Fitzgerald responsible to pay plaintiff's 
commission (as between Monte Vista's former shareholders and 
Fitzgerald) does not specify the amount of plaintiff's 
commission. Arguablyf that could be supplied by custom. 
Richards v. Hodson, 485 P.2d 1044 (Utah 1971); Nev v. 
Harrison, 299 P.2d 1114 (Utah 1956); 72 Am Jur.2d "Statute 
of Frauds" §297-. At the minimum, the Earnest Money Agree-
ment (R. 152 and attached as Exhibit "C") together with the 
Stock Sale Agreement (R. 182-195), conclusively shows that 
Monte Vista's former shareholders are the "we" referred to 
in Ohran's admission. The material necessary to satisfy the 
Statute of Frauds need not be contained in one writing but 
may be pieced together from several sources. Fritsch v. 
Hess, 162 P. 70 (Utah 1916); 72 Am Jur.2d "Statute of 
Frauds" §371. 
Ohran's actual deposition testimony referred to in 
his in-court admission is attached as Exhibit E. It is part 
of the record (R. 81-87). Using the term "we," Ohran admits 
to an agreement to pay plaintiff a 6% commission on the sale 
of the property (R. 81) . It is clear from the transcript 
that the "we" refers to Monte Vista and its former share-
holders. (See, for example, R.84, lines 23 and 24; R. 85, 
line 13, and the entire context of the admission). 
THE STATUTE CF FRAUDS DOES NOT APPLY 
BECAUSE THE CONTRACT WAS FULLY PERFORMED 
Part performance generally satisfies the Statute 
of Frauds. 73 Am Jur.2d "Statute of Frauds" §405, et. seq. 
Utah follows the general rule. Greenwood v. Jackson, 128 
P.2d 282 (Utah 1942). In the present case, plaintiff fully 
performed. This is not just a part performance case. 
Defendants rely heavily on Smith Realty Co. v. 
Dioietro, 292 915 (Utah 1930) and Case v. Ralph, 188 P. 40 
- ' • * - * 
(Utah 1920) to support their conclusion that the doctrine of 
part performance does not apply in situations where a real 
estate broker seeks his commission when no written contract 
for that commission exists. Both Smith Realty Co. v. 
Dioietro, supra and Case v. Ralph, supra were decided before 
the Rules of Court Procedure were liberalized to permit 
notice pleading. A close reading of both those cases shows 
that they were each decided on the basis that the plaintiffs 
did not adequately allege that any kind of a contract for a 
commission existed. 
Defendants also cite Young v. Buchanan, 259 P. 2d 
876 (Utah 1953) and Watson v. Odell, 198 P. 772 (Utah 1921). 
Neither of these cases actually held that full performance 
does not satisfy the Statute of Frauds in real estate 
commission cases. Watson v. Odell, supra, held that the 
real estate agent could not recover under the specific 
wording of his contract where the underlying sale did not 
occur. Young v. Buchanan, supra held that an unlicensed 
real estate agent could not use a licensed broker's license 
when he was acting as an independent contractor rather than 
an employee. To be sure, the cases defendants cite hold 
that a real estate commission cannot be recovered under a 
quantum merit theory. But they do not establish any rule 
that full performance of an express contract cannot satisfy 
the Statute of Frauds in real estate commission cases. 
To plaintiff's knowledge, the only Utah case which 
has squarely decided whether full performance satisfies the 
Statute of Frauds in real estate commission cases is Kerr v. 
Hillyard, 170 P. 981 (Utah 1918) . That case held full 
performance would satisfy the Statute of Frauds. Like Kerr 
v. Hillyard, the pending case does not involve a situation 
where the agent found a willing buyer but the sale did not 
go through. The contract was not just partly performed, it 
was fully performed. That satisfies the Statute of Frauds. 
POINT VI 
PLAINTIFF DID NOT ACT AS A 
SECURITIES BROKER DEALER 
The sale in this case was finally effected as a 
sale of stock (R. 182-195). Thus, the Statute of Frauds 
should not apply at all. 
The argument that the Statute of Frauds still 
applies because plaintiff was not a licensed securities 
broker is without merit. First, plaintiff never intended to 
arrange a stock sale (R. 152) . He always felt he was 
selling property. He did not take part in changing the form 
of the transaction and did not even learn that the form of 
transaction had been changed until well after the Stock 
Purchase Agreement had been executed (R. 197-19 8) . 
Secondly, the transaction was an isolated one. 
The Securities Laws in effect at that time defined a securi-
ties "broker-dealer" as a person "engaged in the business of 
effecting transactions in securities for the account of 
others or for his own account." Section 61-1-13 Utah Code 
Annotated. Because the transaction was an isolated one and 
because plaintiff did not play a part in changing the form 
of the deal, plaintiff was not "in the business" of dealing 
in securities. He was not a securities "broker-dealer" and 
did not have to be licensed as such. 
Yet the sale was consummated as a sale of stock 
(R. 182-195). Thus, the transaction does not fall within 
the literal wording of the Statute of Frauds. 
CONCLUSION 
The real issue in this case is not res judicata, 
collateral estoppel, or the Statute of Frauds. The real 
issue in this case is whether plaintiff intended to release 
Monte Vista and its former shareholders from all liability 
when he tried to secure payment from Fitzgerald. That issue 
is a fact question that has never been addressed. The case 
should be remanded for determination of that issue. 
DATED this ^ day of January, 1986. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
By: /<$/ . 
DAVID M. JORGENSEN 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
--000O000--
STATEMENT OF POINTS AND 
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS 
Civil No. 60784 
MEL TRIMBLE REAL ESTATE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MONTE VISTA RANCH, INC., a 
Utah corporation, WALLACE 
OHRAN, RAY E. NELSON, HOWARD 
D. SHERWOOD, JOYCE T. RICE, 
and NELDON WILLIAMS, 
Defendants. 
—oooOooo--
COME NOW defendants, Wallace Ohran, Ray E. Nelson, Howard D. 
Sherwood, Joyce T. Rice and Neldon Williams, by and through their 
attorney of record, and hereby submit this statement of points 
and authorities in support of their Motion to Dismiss the complaint 
on file herein. 
On or about June 1982, plaintiff in this matter filed a 
complaint naming, among others, Wallace Ohran, Ray E. Nelson, 
Howard D. Sherwood, Joyce T. Rice and Neldon Williams as defen-
dants. In Count I of the complaint, plaintiff maintains that Cal 
Florence, a real estate agent for the plaintiff, prior to December 
1977, allegedly entered into an oral agreement with the defendant 
Wallace Ohran as President of Monte Vista Ranch, Inc., a Utah 
corporation, to pay a real estate commission to plaintiff of 6% in 
the event that plaintiff could obtain a purchaser for the Monte 
Vista Ranch. Plaintiff seeks judgment against all defendants, 
severally and jointly, in the sum of $88,750.00 plus interest. 
The complnint alsn eoniwiins /i C;IUH»? of action entitled Count II 
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based upon a claim sounding in quantum meruit. Plaintiff alleges 
that its agent, Cal Florence, expended time, energy and assets in 
putting together a transaction involving the sale of the Monte 
Vista Ranch and is entitled to be compensated for the reasonable 
value of such time, energy and assets. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM IS BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH. 
Utah Code Annotated Section 25-5-4 states as follows: 
25-5-4--Certain Agreements Void Unless Written and Sub-
s c r i b e d — I n the following cases, every agreement shall be 
void unless such agreement, or some note or memorandum 
thereof, is in writing subscribed by the parties to be 
ch n r g ed r h e row i t h : 
(5) Every agreement authorizing or employing an agent or 
broker to purchase or sell real estate for compensation. 
The above statutory language is clear and unambiguous. The 
Utah State Legislature has imposed a requirement upon real estate 
brokers and agents to obtain in writing any authorization or 
employment agreement authorizing or employing an agent of broker 
to purchase or sell real estate for compensation. 
In this matter, Monte Vista Ranch, Inc., by and through 
Wallace Ohran as President and Howard Sherwood as Secretary, on or 
about December 7, 1977, entered into an Earnest Money Receipt and 
Offer to Purchase with a potential purchaser of the property, 
Leland A. Fitzgerald. A copy of said Earnest Money Receipt and 
Offer to Purchase is attached hereto and designated Exhibit "A". 
Said agreement clearly provides on line 22 that: "Buyer to be 
responsible for all real estate commissions." The language of this 
agreement is clear and unambiguous. It cannot be argued in good 
faith that by signing said agreement through its corporate 
officers that Monte Vista Ranch, Inc. agreed to be responsible to 
X 
111 
< 
5 £ ^  -
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
C H 5 * 2 
• > H r »s 
d 
z 
3 0 
> 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
or pay a commission to Cal Florence, the real estate agent, or 
the plaintiff therein as the real estate broker, a real estate 
commission in connection with that transaction. 
In fact, Mel Trimble Real Estate and Cal Florence as plain-
tiffs filed an action against Leland A. Fitzgerald as defendant in 
the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, Civil No. C-78-4944, making a claim in that action 
that they were entitled to receive and recover a real estate 
commission from Leland A. Fitzgerald. Leland A. Fitzgerald there-
after filed a third-party complaint against Wallace Ohran, Ray E. 
Nelson, Howard D. Sherwood, Joyce T. Rice and Neldon Williams 
alleging that he was entitled to recover from those third-party 
defendants an amount equal to any judgment that would be entered 
against him as defendant in the Salt Lake County matter. The 
matter was tried to a jury and plaintiffs in that matter failed to 
recover judgment against the purchaser. It is noteworthy that 
plaintiff in this action failed to file a claim against Monte 
Vista Ranch, Inc. or any of the other defendants in this matter 
alleging that these defendants owed a real estate commission to 
Mel Trimble Real Estate or Cal Florence. Now, more than four 
years later, plaintiff seeks to bring an action against these 
defendants having lost in its previous action against Leland A. 
Fitzgerald. 
Certainly these defendants must be considered indispensable 
parties to the prior action and plaintiff having failed to state a 
cause of action against them or to have joined them as defendants 
in the prior action has waived his right to bring a subsequent 
action against them. 
In conclusion on this point of the argument, these defendants 
respectfully submit that plaintiff!s claim herein is barred by 
failure to comply with the Statute of Frauds and further by failure 
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to join an indispensable party to the prior action. 
POINT II 
A REAL ESTATE BROKER OR AGENT MAY ONLY RECOVER BY VIRTUE OF A 
WRITTEN CONTRACT AND CANNOT RECOVER ON A BASIS OF QUANTUM MERUIT. 
The Utah State Supreme Court held in the cases of Watson v. 
Odell, 58 Utah 276, 198 P. 772, and Case v. Ralph, 56 Utah 243, 
188 P. 640, cited with approval on the case of Young, et al v. 
Buchanan, 259 P.2d 876, that a broker or agent may recover only by 
virtue of contract and cannot recover upon basis of quantum 
meruit. The Court also cited with approval 20 ALR 280 for the 
same point. Tho Bjichnnan case* clearly stands for the proposition 
that a broker or agent cannot recover upon the basis of quantum 
meruit and therefore Count II of the complaint should be dismissed. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff in this matter has not satisfied the Statute of 
Frauds and Count I of the complaint should be dismissed. Plain-
tiff does not have a listing signed by any of the defendants in 
the above case authorizing or employing plaintiff or plaintiff's 
agent, Cal Florence, to purchase or sell the Monte Vista Ranch for 
compensation. With respect to Count II, Utah law is clear that a 
real estate broker or agent cannot recover upon the basis of 
quantum meruit and Count II should be dismissed. 
DATED this day of July, 1982. 
T^v^ 
/JOHN C. BACKLUND 
attorney for Defendants 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a copy of the foregoing to 
Valden P. Livingston, Attorney for Plaintiff, 965 East 4800 South, 
Suite 2, Salt Lake City, Utah 84117, postage prepaid, this IS** 
day of July, 1982. 
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INTRODUCTION 
fl "i i/J Plaintiffs seek to recover from defendant pursuant to 
L d-party beneficiary contract. Plaintiffs believe that the 
evidence will show that the contract was in writing. As such, 
the Statute of Frauds would not apply to this case. However, 
the defendant has pleaded that the contract is oral and therefore 
subject to the Statute of Frauds. 
Of necessity this brief must deal with both theories— 
written or oral contract. However, it may be useful to give 
the court a "key" to show which issues relate to the written 
contract theory, which issues relate to the oral contract theory, 
and which issues overlap. 
Written Contract Theory 
Point I 
Point II 
Point III 
Point IV 
Point V 
Oral Contract Theory 
Point I 
Point III 
Point IV 
Point V 
Point VI 
Point VII 
Point VIII 
Throughout this brief the plaintiffs will generally 
be referred to as the broker, the defendant will generally 
be referred to as the buyer, and the Monte Vista Ranch Corp. 
and its officers and directors will generally be referred to 
as seller. The following diagram will familiarize the court 
with the relationships: 
/ 
\ 
Seller ' Euyer 
Third Party / ' i Defendant 
Defendant / \ 
A / 
Monte Vistax / Lcland 
Ranch Corp. \ ritzgerald 
(Wallace Ohran, Pres.)
 / 
\ 
/ 
Broker 
Plaintiffs 
Jlel Trimble Real Estate 
(Cal Florence as agent) 
A major portion of the brief will be devoted to 
concepts of a third-party beneficiary contract. Under that 
theory, the relationships change somewhat and the following' 
diagram may be helpful: 
/' 
/ 
Buyer 
Fitzgerald 
^ Promisor agrees to 
•pay $1,825^000 
•directly to / 
promisee 
Seller 
Monte Vista 
Ranch, Inc. 
/ 
Promisor 
\ 
y 
/ Promisee 
\ / 
/ 
\ Promisor aarees to pay 
$125,000 directly to" -
beneficiary / 
Mel Trimble 
Real Estate 
'Beneficiary 
FACTS 
Although contested, the facts of this case are 
relatively simply. 
Some years ago broker entered into an oral arrangement 
with Mr. Ohran to sell a ranch known as Monte Vista Ranch. 
The seller was president of the corporation that owned the ranch. 
The broker placed advertisements and showed the ranch 
to a number of potential purchasers. One day the buyer noticed 
the advertisements and called broker. They discussed the rar.ch 
by telephone and went together for an inspection of the property. 
After some protracted negotiations, buyer, seller 
and broker met at Gene Fullmer's restaurant to finalize their 
deal. At that time seller quoted a sales price of $2,000,000. 
However, seller said he would reduce that price to $1,97 5,000 
on the condition that buyer would pay a commission of $125,000 
directly to the broker. Everyone agreed. 
Thereafter the parties met at an accountant's 
office in American Fork. The arrangement was reduced to a 
standard Earnest Money Contract which was executed by both 
buyer and seller. That Earnest Money Contract is attached 
hereto as Exhibit "A". 
The Earnest Money Contract specifically provides 
that: "Buyer to be responsible for all commissions." 
The *nl Try'^g day buyer gave broker a $5,000 
payment toward the commission. Thereafter, buyer and seller 
met separately and made some minor changes in their arrangement. 
The primary change had to do with tax planning. Instead of 
conveying just the ranch, seller conveyed the entire corporation 
to buyer. However, the sole asset of the corporation was the 
ranch. The final Stock Sale Agreement between buyer •ajid seller 
is attached hereto as Exhibit "B". 
Broker has made repeated demands for buyer to pay 
the balance of the commission. Buyer has refused to pay any 
further commission. 
Broker filed this lawsuit to enforce a third-party 
beneficiary contract under which the buyer was obligated to 
pay a $125,000 commission as part of the purchase price. 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFFS ARE THE BENEFICIARIES 
OF A THIRD-PARTY BENEFICIARY 
CONTRACT WHICH THEY *1AY ENFORCE 
In this action, seller orally promised to pay broker 
a commission if he found a purchaser for the ?4onte Vista Ranch. 
Pursuant to that arrangement, broker found a buyer. Hov:ever, 
seller's obligation was subject to the defense of the Statute 
of Frauds because his promise was oral. Utah Code Ann. 
S 25-5-4(5). 
In the final negotiations, seller transferred his 
obligation to pay a commission to buyer. Seller had originally 
agreed to sell the ranch for $2,000,000 and to pay broker his 
6% commission. After some negotiations, the purchase price 
was lowered from $2,000,000 to $1,875,000 on the condition 
that buyer would pay broker a commission of $12 5,000. 
When two parties enter into a contract with the 
intent to benefit a third party, a third-party beneficiary 
contract is formed which the beneficiary may enforce. See, e.c., 
Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. First Security Corp., 9 Utah 2d 215, 
341 P.2d 944 (1959); Fisk v. Stevens, 33 P. 248 (Utah 1893); 
Moran v. Audette, 217 A.2d 653 (D.C.Cir. 1966); Continental 
Bank and Trust Co. v. Stewart, 4 Utah 2d 228, 291 P.2d 890 (1955).; 
4 Corbin on Contracts §§ 821-22. 
The early Utah case of Brown v. Markland, 52 P. 597 
(Utah 1898) demonstrates the principle of a third-party 
beneficiary contract. In that case defendant purchased a mine. 
As part of the purchase contract, defendant agreed to pay certain 
"claims of persons who have performed labor upon or furnished 
material" to the mine. , Plaintiff had performed labor on the mine 
and sued for payment. Defendant refused to pay. The Utah Supreme 
Court held that the plaintiff was a beneficiary to the third-
party -beneficiary contract between the purchaser and seller of 
the nine and as such could enforce his claim: 
The contract thus made, for a valuable 
consideration, inured to her benefit, 
and the grantee of the premises became 
the promisor. She thereafter had a right 
to look to him for payment of her claim, 
under the rule that 'where a promise or 
contract has been made between two parties 
for the benefit of a third, an action will 
lie thereon at the instance and in the 
name of the party to be benefited, although 
the promise or contract was made without 
his knowledge, and without any considera-
tion moving from him,' [Citations omitted.] 
52 P. 597 at 599. 
The case most exactly on point is Peter's Grazinc Ass'n'. 
v. Legerski, 544 P.2d 499 (Wyo. 1976). In that case the seller 
of a ranch had agreed to pay a real estate commission. During 
the negotiations for the purchase of the ranch, the sales price 
was lowered from $2,060,000 to $2,030,000 on the condition that 
the buyer would pay the real estate commission of $30,000. 
The buyer agreed and purchased the ranch, but he refused to pay 
the commission. The Wyoming Supreme Court held that the real 
estate agent was a beneficiary of a third-party beneficiary con-
tract and the buyer was ordered to pay the commission: 
In examination of all the circumstances, 
we repeat what has previously been inferred. 
This was a contract arrangement whereby the 
defendant agreed to pay plaintiff a broker's 
commission, owed to plaintiff by the Peters 
estate, under a settlement agreement between* 
the plaintiff and the executor. The amount 
of the consideration agreed to be paid for 
the ranch took this into account. What 
actually exists contractually is a third 
party beneficiary contract. It was not 
necessary that plaintiff perform any ser-
vices for the defendant. 
It is a well settled rule of law that 
where one person agrees with another, on 
a sufficient consideration, to do a thing 
for the benefit of a third person, the third 
person may enforce the agreement, and it is 
not necessary that any consideration move 
from the latter. It is enough if there is 
a sufficient consideration between the parties 
who made the contract. 
* • + 
It would be inequitable to permit defendant to 
avoid payment of plaintiff's claim. It 
would result in a windfall to that organiza-
tion and amount to unjust enrichment. Its 
offer for the ranch was $2,060,000.00. 
The lesser price of $2,030,000.00 was 
agreed upon solely for the purpose of 
shifting the obligation of payment to 
the defendant. There is a lack of any 
suggestion in the record of any offer 
to pay the Peters estate the $30,000.00 
by which the sale price was reduced. 
It would unjustly gain not only at the 
expense of the plaintiff but at the 
expense of the Peters estate as well. 
As noted, when we slash through th 
underbrush, we find that the $30,000.00 
was actually part of the consideration 
for the ranch .... 
544 P.2d at 457-58. 
POINT II 
THE THIRD-PARTY BENEFICIARY 
CONTRACT WAS REDUCED TO WRITING, 
AND THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS IS 
THEREFORE INAPPLICABLE 
The parties discussed their oral arrangement in 
detail. However, it is not necessary for the broker to rely on 
any oral conversation or oral contract. On December 7, 1977 
the arrangement was reduced to writing in the form of a standard 
Earnest Money Contract (Exhibit "A"). That writing is sufficient 
within its four corners to constitute a complete contract 
between the parties. 
The seller has raised the affirmative defense of 
Statute of Frauds. That statute states in part: 
In the following cases every agreement 
shall be void unless such agreement ... 
is in writing subscribed by the party 
to be charged therewith: 
Since the Earnest Money Agreement is in writing, 
it is by definition outside the Statute of Frauds. 
Buyer's only conceivable argument is that the written 
Earnest Money Agreement is somehow incomplete. That is to say 
it doesn't contain all of the terms between the parties. 
Therefore, it is arguably a non contract. If the Earnest 
Money Agreement is a non contract, broker would be forced to 
rely on some oral contract to establish liability. 
However, the terms of th- Earnest Money Agreement 
are spelled out in great detail. broker subnits that the 
Earnest Money Agreement is a complete written third-party 
beneficiary contract which can be enforced by the beneficiary. 
To begin with, note what is included in the 
agreement: 
1. Date; 
2. Where the contract was made; 
3. Name of the buyer; 
4. Name of the seller; 
5. The amount of earnest money deposit; 
6. The form of earnest money deposit; 
7. Description of the land to be sold; 
8. Description of the equipment to be included 
in the sale; 
9. The total purchase price; 
10. The total down payment; 
11. The terms for handling the installment contract; 
12. Lot release provisions; 
13. Arrangement for pro-rating the taxes; 
14. Possession date; 
15. Date of closing; 
16. Provision for conveyance of title and 
title insurance; 
17. Provision for liquidated damages; 
18. Provision for attorney fees; 
19. Provision for the buyer to pay real estate 
commissions; 
20. Signature of the parties. 
Admittedly, some matters are not spelled out in detail. 
For example, the document does not spell out who will get the 
real estate commission; nor does the document set the amount of 
the real estate commission. 
However, such details hardly make the Earnest Money 
Agreement a non contract. Indeed, there is probably not a 
contract in existence that spells out all details. 
See, e.g., Blackhawk Heat & P. Co. v. Data Lease Fin. Corp. , 
302 S.2d 404, 408-9 (Tla. 1974): 
Even though all the details are not 
definitely fixed, an agreement may be 
binding if the parties agree on the 
essential terms and seriously understand 
and intend the agreement to be binding 
on them. A subsequent difference as to 
the construction of the contract does 
not affect the validity of the contract 
or indicate the minds of the parties did 
not meet with respect thereto. 
The contract should not be held void 
for uncertainty unless there is no other 
way out. As was stated by Justice Cardczo 
in Heyman Cohen & Sons, Inc. v. M. Lurie 
Woolen Co. , Inc., 232 N.Y. 112, 133 N\E. 
370, 371, 'Indefiniteness must reach the 
point where construction becomes futile.' 
Again turning to Professor Corbin, he 
states at § 95, page 400: 
'If the parties have concluded a 
transaction in which it appears they 
intend to make a contract, the court 
should not frustrate their intention 
if it is possible to reach a fair and 
just result, even though this requires 
a choice among conflictinq meanings and 
filling of some gaps that the parties 
have left.' 
Professor Corbin again states at 
§ 95/ page 396: 
'In considering expressions of agree-
ment, the court must not hold the parties 
to some impossible, or iaesl, or unusual 
standard. It must take language as it is 
and people as they are. All agreements 
have some degree of indefiniteness and 
some degree of uncertainty.' 
See also: J.W. Knapo Co. v. Sinas, 172 N.W.2d 867 (Mich.ADD. 
1969); 
S. Jun Kreedman & Co. v. Mover Bros. , 130 Cal.Rptr. 41 
(Cal.App. 1976). 
True, the broker's name was not included. However, 
that matter may be supplied by the doctrine of practical 
construction: 
Under the doctrine of practical con-
struction, when a contract is ambiguous 
and the parties place their own construction 
on their agreement and so perform, the court 
may consider this as persuasive evidence 
of what their true intention was. The 
parties, by their action and performance, 
have demonstrated what was their meaning 
and intent; the contract should be enforced 
by the courts. 
534 P.2d at 90. 
See also: Bullfrog Marina, Inc. v, Lentz, 28 Utah 2d 261, 266; 
Bullough v. Simons, 16 Utah 2d 304, 308; 
Vernon v. Lake Motors, 26 Utah 2d 269, 275. 
Everyone knew who the broker was. Indeed, the day 
following the execution of the Earnest Money Agreement, buyer 
delivered $5,000 to broker toward the commission. As a matter 
of practical construction, the parties clearly knew and intended 
that Mel Trimble Real Estate was the person who should receive 
the real estate commission. 
It is further true that the written contract does not 
state the amount of the commission. Again, that is no reason 
to find a non contract. The recent case of Ferris v. Jennings, 
595 P.2d 857 (Utah 1979) is squarely in point. In that case 
defendant (and counter-claimant) sought to enforce an oral 
purchase agreement. Defendant contended that there was no binding 
contract because the amount of the commission was specified— 
"a fair commission." The court ruled that the failure to specify 
an exact amount for commissions did not defeat the contract. 
A contract is not fatally defective 
as to price if their is an agreement 
as to some formulae or method for 
fixing it. 
* * * 
Where the transaction with respect to 
the main subject matter of a contract 
is definite, an agreement for fixing 
reasonable compensation lor some 
adjunctive service in connection 
therewith does not render the contract 
so indefinite as to be unenforceable. 
595 P.2d at 859. 
The court may let in parol evidence to assist in the 
interpretation and construction of the Earnest Money Agreement. 
However, it is important to note that such parol evidence would 
come in as ctn aid in interpreting an existing written contract. 
The parol evidence does not come in to establish an independent 
oral contract. 
The Utah Statute of Frauds covers situations where 
the existence of a contract must be proven by parol evidence. 
The statute is not intended to cover every circumstance where 
parol evidence is used to help interpret an existing written 
contract. 
POINT III 
THE THIRD-PARTY BENEFICIARY 
CONTRACT CANNOT BE ABROGATED 
OR RESCINDED BECAUSE PLAINTIFFS 
HAVE ACCEPTED IT AND ACTED UPON IT 
Broker claims a commission under the terms of the 
Earnest Money Contract (or at least under the terms of some 
companion oral contract). However, buyer contends that the 
Earnest Money Contract somehow expired or was abrogated. 
Defendant contends that buyer and seller executed a Stock Sale 
Agreement some months later that did not include any provision 
for a real estate commission. Seller contends that broker's 
claim for a commission died when the Earnest Money Contract 
was cancelled. 
However, even if the parties made a new contract, 
the court should not allow seller to escape payment of a 
commission. Seller agreed to pay that real estate commission 
under a third-party beneficiary contract. Where the beneficiary 
to such an agreement accepts, adopts, or acts upon the agreement, 
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the promisor and promisee cannot rescind or modify it without 
his consent so as to deprive him of his rights unless they 
have specifically reserved the right to do so. 
Plunkett v. Atkins, 371 P.2d 727 (Okla. 19G2); 
Rhodes v. Rhodes, 266 S.W.2d 790 (Ky.Ct.App. 1953); 
Pitzer v. Wedel, 165 P.2d 971 (Cal.App. 1946); 
Oman v, Yates, 422 P.2d 489 (Wash. 1967); 
Restatement of Contracts § 14 2; 
4 Corbin on Contracts § 815 at 256. 
The rule is correctly stated in Oman as follows: 
It is undoubtedly true that once 
a contract has been completely formed 
for the benefit of a third party the 
promisor and promisee may not get 
together and mutually rescind, unless 
the contract, by its terms, reserves 
the right so to do; nor may the 
promisee (Rheims) unilaterailv revoke. 
422 P.2d 495. 
In addition, Corbin has stated: 
In a much greater number of cases, 
however, it has been definitely held 
that the promisor and the promisee 
can rescind their contract at any time 
before the creditor beneficiary has 
"assented" or "accepted" or acted in 
reliance upon the contract. 
No general statement has been agreed 
upon by the courts as to the exact moment 
when the promisee first loses his power 
to disch rge* There seems to be no doubt 
that such power is lost as soon as the 
beneficiary has begun to act in reliance 
upon the contract; and the rule is 
generally stated to the effect that the 
power of discharge is gone as soon as 
the third party has expressed his assent. 
(Emphasis added.) 
* 4 Corbin on Contracts § S15 at 256-5S. 
The case of Rhodes v. Rhodes, supra, illustrates the 
point that once the third party accepts, adopts or acts upon 
the contract, the parties thereto cannot rescind or modify it 
to deprive the third party of his rights thereunder. In that 
case, Rhodes entered into an employment contract. Among other 
things, the contract stated that if Rhodes died before reaching 
age 65, annuity payments would be made to his infant son. Several 
years later Rhodes divorced his wife and remarried. The employ-
ment contract was rescinded and a new one entered into with the 
same company. Several changes were made in the terms, including 
the substitution of his new wife as the beneficiary of the 
annuity payments rather than his son. The Kentucky Court of 
Appeals held that the son was a beneficiary to a third-party 
beneficiary contract which could not be rescinded because he 
had accepted it prior to the substitution of Rhodes' new wife 
therein. 
In this case broker was present when buyer agreed 
to purchase the ranch for $1,875,000 plus payment of $125,000 
commission to the broker. In fact, the broker helped negotiate 
that agreement and even brought the parties together. Broker 
never objected to it. He accepted it as the manner in which 
he would be paid and he looked to buyer for payment. Shortly 
after the agreement was made, broker accepted $5,000 from the 
buyer as part payment of the third-party beneficiary obligation. 
Any rescission or modification of that agreement by buyer and 
seller occurred several weeks after the agreement was reached 
and several weeks after the $5,000 payment was made. It is 
apparent that broker accepted, adopted and acted in reliance 
upon the third-party beneficiary contract prior to the time 
of any rescission or modification thereto. As such, any 
rescission or modification cannot be used by seller or buyer 
to prevent broker from collecting his commission. 
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POINT IV 
THE PROMISOR OF A THIRD-PARTY 
BENEFICIARY CONTRACT MUST PAY 
THE BENEFICIARY EVEN IF THE 
PROMISSEE HAD NO OBLIGATION' 
TO THE BENEFICIAL 
Po^ the sake of clarity, we repeat here the scenario. 
Seller orally promised to pay a 6% commission to broker. That 
original par°l agreement would have fallen squarely under the 
statute of frauds (Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-4(5)). Thus, we might 
assume arguendo that the original contract between seller 
and broker was unenforceable. However, at a later time the 
seller made a new oral agreement directly with the buyer. Under 
that oral aqreement, buyer promised to purchase the ranch by 
delivering $1,875,000 directly to seller and $125,000 to the 
broker. 
Tn£ buyer now seeks to avoid payment of that $125,000. 
Buyer contends that the seller had no obligation to pay a 
commission ifl the first place because of the statute of frauds. 
The buyer argues that he should not be obligated to pay a debt 
which never e^ ist^ fc ox VnicYi vas barrel b^ Vne ^tavat^ of ira^s* 
However, it is completely immaterial whether or not seller was 
originally obligated to pay the $125,000 to the broker. The 
buyer is not entitled to the benefit of defenses which /night 
have originally existed between the seller and the broker. 
This principle is explained in Peters Grazing Ass'n 
v. Legerski, 544 P.2d.449 (Wyo. 1976) as follows: 
Where the promisor agrees to pay 
a 5um of money to a third party, to whom 
th£ promisee says he is indebted, it is 
immaterial whether the promisee is 
actually indebted to that amount at all, 
and defenses which promisee might have 
had available against third party are 
noC available to the promisor. 
544 P.2d at 458. 
See also: 4 Corbin on Contracts § 821-22. 
It is also illustrated by two cases, McKay v. Ward, 
20 Utah 149, 57 P. 1024 (1899) and Lane v. Davis, 342 P. 267 
<vC^ l.kpp. 186>9\» Itv *\cKay > the. hviyer of a. niece, of real estate.> 
as part of the purchase price, promised the seller to pay the-
nortgage thereon held by the bank. The seller had purchased 
the real estate from a third person taking it subject to the 
same mortgage. The seller had never agreed to pay the mortgage, 
being subject only to a foreclosure sale of the property if he 
did not. When the buyer failed to pay the mortgage, the bank 
foreclosed and sued the buyer for the deficiency. The bank 
sued for the deficiency as a third-party beneficiary to the 
contract for the purchase of the real estate. The issue in the 
case was whether a third-party beneficiary could collect from 
the promisee under a third-party beneficiary contract when 
the promisor was himself not obligated to the beneficiary. 
The Utah Supreme Court held that the promisee still had to pay 
the mortgage even if the promisee vas not obligated to do so: 
Utah, and some other states, hold that 
a purchaser is liable on his assumption 
and agreement to pay the mortgage, 
although the agreement to assume and 
pay it be in a deed from a grantor who 
was under no personal liability to pay 
the mortgage. In these states it is 
held that the price of the land is a 
sufficient consideration for the agree^ 
ment to pay the mortgage debt, and that, 
where the amount of the mortgage is 
withheld for the purpose of satisfying 
the obligation, a vendor may rightfully 
direct how, when and to whom the purchase 
price of property he sells may be paid? 
that he may rightfully receive it to higl~ 
self, donate it to public charity, or 
make such other disposition of it as 
may best meet his views; that where a 
promise or contract has been made between 
two parties,for the benefit of a third, 
action will lie thereon at the instance 
of the third party to be benefited, 
although the promise, or contract vas 
made without the knowledge of the third 
party, and without any consideration 
moving direct from him; that, if the 
vendee agrees to pay in accordance 
with such directions of the vendor, 
he cannot set up as a defense that 
his vendor was under no dutv to acoiv 
and pay the fund in the manner agreea. 
(Emphasis added.) 
57 P. at 1025 
In Lane v. Davis, supra, a real estate broker was 
orally engaged to sell real property for a 5% commission. The 
broker found a buyer who eventually purchased the property. 
The escrow agreement stated that the broker was to get one-half 
of. the commission and the other one-half was to go to another 
person. The court held that the oral agreement was invalid 
under the statute of frauds but that the broker should be 
allowed to amend the complaint to state a claim as a beneficiary 
to the escrow agreement which was a third-party beneficiary 
contract. 
If the promisor places no conditions on his promise, 
then it matters not what defenses are available to the promisee 
against the beneficiary. Of course, the promisor may promise 
to pay the beneficiary only if the third party's claims against 
the promisee are enforceable and not subject to some defense, 
such as the statute of frauds. This principle is explained by 
Corbin: 
There is nothing to prevent a promisor 
from undertaking a larger duty than the 
duty owed by the promisee to the beneficiary. 
He can make his own promise unconditional, 
although the duty of the promisee to the 
beneficiary is conditional upon an uncertain 
event." If he promises to pay a third party 
a sum claimed by him against the promisee, 
irrespective of defenses that the promisee 
may have, he is bound by his promise in the 
teeth of those defenses, so long as the 
contract does not run afoul of some principle 
of public policy. Promises of this sort 
are often made? a grantee from a mortgagor 
who assures, the debt usually cannot question 
the validity of the mortgage or the debt 
that he promises to pay. 
A promise may be void for illegality or 
lack of sufficient consideration. It may 
be voidable because of infancy, fraud, or 
duress. It may be unenforceable by reason 
of the statute of limitations, discharge 
in bankruptcy, or non-compliance with the 
statute of fraudSo This is not intended 
to be a list including all such possible 
cases. As in the preceding section, so 
here the promisee may contract for either 
a conditional or an unconditional oromise. 
If it is the latter, the facts that would 
operate as a defense to the promisee when 
sued by the third party will not so operate 
when the promisor is sued. (Emphasis added.) 
4 Corbin on Contracts, £§ 821-22. 
See also: Williston on Contracts, S 361 and Restatement of 
Contracts, § 131 (l)(b). 
In this case buyer placed no conditions on his 
promise. He agreed to pay all real estate commissions. {Ea 
Money /agreement, line 22, attached hereto as Exhibit "A".) 
statute of frauds is, therefore, not available to him as a 
defense. He should be compelled to pay the commission. 
POINT V 
THE FACT THAT DEFENDANT PURCHASED 
STOCK RATHER THAN LAND DOES NOT 
AVOID HIS OBLIGATIOrJ TO PAY A 
COMMISSION UNDER THE THIRD-
PARTY BENEFICIARY CONTRACT 
Where a broker is engaged to sell the assets of a 
corporation for a commission, he is entitled to a commission 
where the final sale is one of stock rather than assets. This 
is so because the sale of all of the corporation's stock is in 
substance and effect a sale of the assets. The buyer gets 
what he is after—control of the corporate assets. Feldman v. 
Fiat Estates, Inc. , 268 N.Y.S.2d 949, 25 App.Div.2d 750 (19-66); 
Morad v. Haddad, 110 N.E.2d 364 {Mass. 1953); Rubin v. M.S.W. 
Hotels, Inc., 89 N.Y.S.2d 241, 275 Anp.Div. 829 (1949). 
As stated in Morad: 
The transfer of stock by Kaddad 
effected the sale of the corporate 
property for which Morad had been 
employed to find a customer. The cor-
poration was owned by Haddad. It was 
used by him as an agency through which 
he conducted business. The sale of 
all of the stock of the corporation 
was in legal effect a sale of all of 
its assets, and the mere fact that 
the parties found it more convenient 
to transfer all of the stock rather 
than to make a conveyance of its assets 
does not change the substance of the 
transaction. Benedict v. Dakin, 
243 111. 384, 388, 90 N.E. 712. See 
Seward v. M. Seward & Son Co., 91 Conn. 
190, 99 A. 887; Mills v. Miller, W.Va. 
64 S.Ec2d 111. Morad was entitled to 
the same commission which he would have 
earned had the corporate property been 
directly conveved. (Emphasis added.) 
110 N.E. 2d'at 367-. 
POINT VI 
EVEN IF THE CONTRACT WAS ORAL, 
IT WOULD NOT FALL UNDER THE 
STATUTE OF FRAUDS' SECTION ON 
BROKERAGE COMMISSIONS 
The Utah Statute of Frauds states in part: 
Certain agreements void unless 
written and subscribed. - In the follow-
ing cases every agreement shall be void 
unless such agreement, or some note 
or memorandum thereof, is in writing 
subscribed by the party to be charged 
therewith: ... 
(5) Every agreement authorising 
or employing an agent or broker to 
purchase or sell real estate for 
compensation. 
Utah Code Ann. § 2 5-5-4. 
At one time the broker had an oral contract to sell 
the ranch on behalf of the owner. Of course, that parol 
contract would fall squarely under § 25-5-4(5), Utah Code Ann. 
quote above. However, the parties later changed their arrange-
ment to a third-party beneficiary contract. Specifically, 
seller entered into a direct and independent contract with 
the buyer. In that contract the seller agreed to reduce the 
purchase price from $2,000,000 to $1,875,000 on the condition 
that the seller would pay the real estate commission of 
$125,000. 
This new arrangement was a classic third-party 
beneficiary contract. Buyer is the promisor and the seller 
is the promisee. The broker is the beneficiary. The nature 
of the contract is simply an arrangement between buyer and 
seller on the method or mechanics of handling the payment. 
In other words, seller says in substance: 
I have a ranch worth $2,000,000. I will 
sell it to you if you will give $1,875,000 
directly to me and $125,000 directly to 
the'beneficiary (broker) designated by me. 
In response, the buyer agrees in substance that: 
I acree to purchase your ranch for 
$2,000,000/ I will deliver $2,575,000 
to you and I will deliver $125,000 to 
the beneficiary (broker) designated 
by you. 
It is obvious on its face that this is not "an agree-
ment ... employing a broker to purchase or sell . .. . " Utah Code 
Ann. § 25-5-4(5). Here no one is asking, telling, or expecting 
the broker to sell or purchase anything. Indeed, the broker 
has no duties. For the purposes of the third-party beneficiary 
contract, the broker is a passive bystander. 
The legislature could have covered this type of 
arrangement under the Statute of Trauds. It chose not to do so. 
The court should not expand the coveranc of the statute by 
judicial legislation. 
POINT VII 
EVEN IF THE THIRD-PARTY 
BENEFICIARY CONTRACT WAS 
ORAL, IT COULD NOT FALL UNDER 
THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS' SECTION 
REGARDING THE "DEBT, DEFAULT 
OR MISCARRIAGE OF ANOTHER" 
The Utah Statute of Frauds states in part: 
Certain agreements void unless written 
and subscribed. In the following cases 
every agreement shall be void unless such 
agreement, or some note or memorandum 
thereof, is in writing subscribed by the 
party to be charged therewith: 
(a) Every promise to answer for the 
debt, default or miscarriage of another. 
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-4. 
Here the buyer agreed to pay a commission, thereby 
relieving the seller of that burden. However, that promise 
does not fall within the language of the statute. 
As a part of the purchase price, buyer agreed to pay 
$1,875,000 to the seller and $125,000 to the broker. Thus, 
when the buyer pays $125,000 to the broker he is not paying 
another person's debt. He is paying his own debt. The doctrine 
is explained by Professor williston: 
In other words, although a promise is 
in form one to pay the debt of another 
and the performance thereof may incidentally 
have the effect of extinguishing the 
liability of another, if the main purpose 
and object in making the promise is not to 
answer for another, but directly to sub* 
serve the interest of the promisor, the 
promise is not within the Statute. The 
theory underlying these decisions is that 
if the promisor is himself acquiring property 
or other pecuniary benefit, he is engaging 
not to pay the debt of another, but his 
own. 
* * * 
If, as between himself and the 
original promisor, the debt really 
ought to be paid by the latter, what-
ever may be the other elements of the 
transaction, the new promisor is on 
principle and in fact promising to 
answer for the debt or default of 
another. Though he is led to do 
this by considerations of his own 
advantage, the ultimate fact that 
the debt is anothers is none the less 
true. On the other hand, if, as 
between the original debtor and the 
new promisor, the latter ought to pay 
the debt, he is promising to answer 
for his own debt, not that of another. 
Williston on Contracts § 472 at 432 and 448. 
The case of Gunnison v. Kaufman, 72 N.W.2d 70 6 (V?isc. 
1955) is illustrative. In that case, a corporation was sold. 
As part of the purchase, the buyers promised to assume certain 
debts of the corporation. Thereafter the buyers refused to pay 
the debts. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin held: 
With respect to the application of the 
statute of frauds: The alleged promise 
which Kaufman made to get Gunnison 'off 
the hook' and personally take care of the 
two obligations at the Reedsburg Bank was 
not a promise to answer for the debts of 
Gunnison to the bank. It was a promise 
made as part of a purchase deal in which 
Kaufman, the purchaser, and Gunnison, the 
seller, agreed that Kaufman's undertaking 
to pay those existing obligations was to be 
part of the purchase price for the property 
he (Kaufman) received. In other words, 
the promise merely specified the method 
by which the promisor (Kaufman) was to 
pay off his own obligations to the 
promisee (Gunnison) for the transfer of 
the corporation property to him (?;aufman). 
The statute of frauds clearly does not 
apply to such a situation. 
72 N.W.-2G 710. 
See also: Campbell v. Hickory farms of Ohio, 190 S.E.2d 26 
(S.C. 1972)? cf. Thompson v. Cheesman, 15 Utah 43, 48 P. 477 
(1897). 
Therefore, the Statute of Frauds provision regarding 
"debts of another" is not applicable. Here the buyer promised 
to pay the 6% commission. He is being asked to pay his own 
debts—not the debts of another. 
POIKT VII 
EVEN IF THE THIRD-PARTY 
BENEFICIARY CONTRACT WAS ORAL, 
THE EARNEST MONEY CONTRACT OF 
DECEMBER 7, 1977, IS A SUFFICIENT 
MEMO TO TAKE THE PROMISE OUTSIDE 
THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS 
Broker seeks to enforce an agreement under which 
buyer promised to pay a commission of $125,000. If that 
contract was oral — it would be void unless there was a 
"written note or memorandum thereof." Section 25-5-4(5) of 
the Utah Code states: 
In the following cases every agreement 
shall be void unless such agreement 
or some note or memorandum thereof, 
is in writing subscribed by the party 
to be charged therewith: 
(5) Every agreement authorizing 
or employing an agent or broker to 
purchase or sell real estate for 
compensation. (Emphasis added.) 
Plaintiffs rely upon the Earnest Money Agreement of 
December 7, 1977, as a sufficient memorandum to take the oral 
agreement outside the statute of frauds. That Earnest Money 
Agreement will be submitted as an exhibit at the trial and is 
attached hereto as Exhibit "A". 
— Plaintiffs argue elsewhere in this brief that the promise was 
not oral at all. It was in writing (Earnest Money Agreement) 
and, therefore, not subject to the statute of frauds. 
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A. Difference Between an Oral Contract and a Memorandum or 
Note Evidencing the Oral Contract. 
In analyzing this issue, it is important to note that 
there is a difference between the oral contract and the written 
memorandum: 
The difference between a contract in 
writing and a memorandum of a parol 
contract is important .... The memo-
randum need not itself constitute a 
contract, and apart from its effect as 
a memorandum, it need have no legal 
operation. There must be a valid 
oral contract, however, of which the 
memorandum is an accurate statement. 
'Except as evidence of the oral contract, 
the memorandum has no force or effect 
unless and until the oral contract 
has been established by a preponderance 
of the evidence. Then if accurate and 
complete, it prevents the interposition 
of the statute of frauds as a bar to the 
enforcement of the oral contract. The 
memorandum, however, need not be made 
with that intent. 
Williston on Contracts § 567A. 
The Earnest Money Agreement (Exhibit "A") is in 
writing and is subscribed to by defendant Fitzgerald. The 
only issue remaining is whether the Earnest Money Agreement is 
a "sufficient" memorandum to take the oral agreement beyond 
the statute of frauds. 
B. Philosophy and Purpose of the Statute. 
Any analysis of this issue must begin with a look 
at the history and purpose of the statute of frauds: 
An effective aid in arriving at the 
requisites and meaning of 'a note or 
memorandum in writing' is an enlightened 
awareness of the origin and fundamental 
purpose of the Statute of Frauds. 
Preoccupied with numerous and oft con-
flicting precepts and decisions involving 
the clauses provided for a note or memo-
randum, -some students of the Statute fail 
to see the beacon for the buoys. 
The Statute of Frauds was not enacted 
to afford persons a means of evading lust 
obligations; nor was it intended to supply 
a cloajc of immunity to hedging litigants 
lacking integrity; nor was it adoptea~to 
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enable defendants to interpose the Statute 
as a bar to a contract fairly, and 
admittedly, made. 
In brief, the Statute 'was intended to 
guard against the perils of perjury and 
error in the spoken word. Therefore, if 
after a consideration of the surrounding 
circumstances, the pertinent facts and all 
the evidence in a particular case, the 
court concludes that enforcement of the 
agreement will not subject the defendant 
to fraudulent claims, the purpose of the 
Statute will best be served by holding 
the note or memorandum sufficient even 
though it by ambigucTus or incomplete. 
Williston on Contracts § 567A. 
C. Parol Evidence Admissible to Show Surrounding Circumstances. 
The landmark case in Utah on this issue is Hawaiian 
Equipment Co. v. Eimco Corp., 207 P.2d 794 (Utah 1949). In 
that case plaintiff and defendant entered into an oral agree-
ment for the purchase of surplus war equipment. Defendant 
raised the statute of frauds as a defense. The only "memorandum" 
of the oral agreement was a telegram which stated: 
Hawaiian Equipment, Honolulu 
"Reference hammers bid maximum 
24 dollars each scalers 17.50 
each Honolulu will take all 
"Eimco" 
The issue on appeal was whether the foregoing (admittedly vague) 
cable was a "sufficient" memorandum to rake the matter outside 
the statute of frauds. 
The court first set forth the guidelines for its 
analysis. The court"quoted with approval the following language 
from Restatement of the Law, Contracts, § 207, which states: 
'A memorandum, in order to make 
enforceable a contract within the 
Statute, may be any document or 
writing, formal or informal, signed 
by the party to be charged or by his 
agent actually or apparently authorized 
thereunto, which states wirh reasonable 
certainty, 
1(a) each party to the contract either 
by his own name,or by such a description 
as will serve to identify him, or by the 
name or description of his agent, and 
*(b) the land, goods, or other 
subject-matter to which the contract 
relates, and 
%
 (c) the terms and conditions of all 
the promises constituting the contract 
and by whom and to whom the promises are 
made. 
'Comment: 
'a. A written memorandum of a 
contract is not identical with a written 
contract. A written contract will indeed 
serve as a memorandum, but a memorandum 
includes also any writing which states 
the terms agreed upon, though not intended 
or adopted by the parties as a final 
complete statement of their agreement. 
The degree of particularity with which 
the terms of the contract, the names or 
descriptions of the parties must be set 
out cannot be reduced to an exact formula. 
There must be 'reasonable' certainty and 
there must be accuracy, but the possibility 
need not be excluded that some other subject-
matter or person than those intended will 
also fall within the words of the writing.1 
The court then quoted that the bare words of the cabl^ 
were incomplete and contained any number of ambiguities. 
However, the court resolved the ambiguities by resort to parol 
evidence, The court said; 
The principle that the goods must be 
identified and the other terms and con-
ditions set forth with reasonable certainty, 
must be considered in connection with the 
knowledge and relationship of the parties 
and trade usages to determine whether the 
contents of the memorandum sufficiently 
conveyed to the parties involved an identity 
of the subject-matter and a reasonable 
certainty of the other terms and conditions. 
While the use of abbreviated phrases 
may render -the writing unintelligible to 
an uninstructed person, the phrase may 
still have meaning when viewed in the 
light of circumstances surrounding the 
sending of the cablegram. When this court 
scrutinizes the language of the cablegram, 
it gives to the words'used the meaning 
ascribed to them by merchants who are 
familiar with their usage and have occasion 
to deal with them in the commercial world. 
Ifr by giving the words such meaning, the 
subject-matter is intelligently identified 
and the terms and conditions are fairiv 
-
disclosed, then parol evidence is admissible 
for a limited purpose. While this type 01 
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evidence is not competent to contra-
dict or vary the terms of a memorandum 
to show what is intended, the situation 
of the parties and the surrounding cir-
cumstances at the time the contract was 
made may be shown by such proof to apply 
the memorandum to the subject matter. 
The cablegram is not so lacking in details 
as to amount to a nullity and when it is 
interpreted in the light of the surround-
ing facts and circumstances, any deficiencies 
are supplied and the instrument then becomes 
certain in all of its terms. The conditions 
are not changed or modified; they are 
explained .... 
207 P.2d at 797-98. 
The doctrine of permitting parol evidence to explain 
or clarify the written memorandum was again followed by the 
Utah Supreme Court in the case of Guinand v. Walton, 22 Utah 2d 
196, 450 P.2d 467 (1969). In that case plaintiff sought to 
enforce a contract to recover for services rendered. Defendant 
(among other defenses) raised the Statute of Frauds. The only 
"writing" in the case was a letter from defendants to plaintiff 
which set forth some, but not all of the conditions of the 
alleged contract. 
In analyzing the issue the court concluded that 
parol evidence would be permitted: 
Inasmuch as the letter was silent on an 
important aspect of the agreement, that 
is, what if anything the defendants 
received for what they granted, the only 
fair and sensible thing to be done was 
what the trial court did: Admit other 
evidence to show what the arrangement 
between the parties was. This was 
necessary to get at the justice of the 
case, whether the letter in question 
amounted to a binding obligation ... 
or even if it did not .... 
450 P.2d at 469. 
As stated in Stanchack v. Cliffside Park Ko. 1527 L.O.M. Inc., 
282 A.2d 775, 779 (N.J.App. 1971): 
[Tjthe writing need not expressly use 
the language of authorization [of a 
broker] 
In determining whether such implication 
is warranted from the words used in 
the writing, however, it is permissible, 
and sometimes, as here essential to 
scrutinize the surrounding circumstances. 
Brookes v, Adolph's, 339 P.2d 879 
Johnson v. Ogle, 181 P.2d 789 
D. The Earnest Money Agreement Confirms the Existence of 
a Separate Oral Contract. 
Based upon the foregoing principles, we now turn 
to an analysis of the December 7, 1977 Earnest Money Agreement. 
To begin with, it was executed by the buyer--"the party to 
be charged." Thus, that portion of the statute is clearly 
satisfied. 
We turn now to the phrase: "Buyer to be responsible 
for all real estate commission." Note that the contract could 
have, but did not say, "Buyer to be responsible for all real 
estate commissions, if any." Thus, the writing clearly confirms 
an existing obligation to pay real estate commissions. The 
writing does not say what duties the real estate agent had to 
perform in order to receive the commission. However, that is 
not necessary. The parties obviously knew and agreed what 
duties the agent would have. Further, the parties obviously 
knew and agreed that the duties had all been satisfied., The 
Earnest Money Agreement acknowledged that the broker's duties 
were satisfactorily provided and that payment was now due. 
In other words, the Earnest Money Agreement serves as a written 
memorandum that the broker orally agreed to undertake the certain 
duties and tht he had satisfactorily performed those duties. 
E. The Earnest Money Agreement Confirms that Buyer Vias one 
Party to the Oral Contract. 
We know at least one of the parties to that oral 
agreement. We know from the writing that the buyer will pay 
the real estate commissions. 
F. The Earnest Money Agreement with Surrounding Circumstances 
Confirms the Amount of the Commission. 
At first blush it is not apparent from the Earnest 
Money Agreement how much money defendant agreed to pay as a 
real estate commission. However, with the aid of parol evidence, 
the agreement does contain sufficient information to establish 
the amount of the commission. 
Note that the contract says that the buyer is to be 
responsible for "all real estate commission We are told by 
Hawaiian Equipment Co. v. Eimco Corp., 207 P.2d 794 (Utah 1949) 
that: 
[T]he situation of the parties and the 
surrounding circumstances at the time 
the contract was made, may be shown by 
such [parol] proof to apply the memo-
randum to the subject matter. 
Here the parol evidence will show that the designated 
price of $1,875,000 had a special meaning which was well known 
to the parties. The parties had agreed that the actual purchase 
price was to be $2,000,000. The parties further agreed to 
reduce the purchase price to $1,875,000 with the express 
stipulation that buyer would pay the commission of $12 5,000. 
With a knowledge of these surroundings, the words of the Earnest 
Money Agreement take on new life and meaning. From the surrounding 
circumstances we know that the intent of the parties was that 
seller would receive a net of $1,875,000 directly, and that the 
buyer would deliver $125,000 to broker as a commission (thereby 
relieving the seller of any obligation or claim to pay those 
commissions) . 
Taken together with the surrounding circumstances, 
the Earnest Money Agreement shows the formulae used by the 
parties to set the commission: 
1. Sales price - $2,000,000 with seller 
to pay commission; 
2. Price reduced to $1,875,000 with 
buyer to pay commission; 
3. Commission equal to difference 
between $2,000,000 and $1,875,000; 
4. Commission equal to $125,000. 
Although there is authority contra, a number of 
cases have heid that parol evidence may be used to determine 
the amount of the commission: 
Moore v. Borofeldt, 273 P. 1114 (Cal. 1929); 
Caminettl v. National Guarantee Life Co., 
132 P.2d 318 (Cal. 1972) ; 
Brunner v. Van's Markets, 229 P.2d 56 
(Cal. 1951); 
Herring v. Fisher, 242 P.2d 963 (Cal. 1952). 
£f: Ferris v. Jennincs, 595 P.2d 857 (Utah 1979). 
K. Expiration or Abrogation of the Earnest Money Agreement 
Does Not Nullify its Effect as a Note or Memorandum of 
a Separate Oral Contract. 
Defendant might contend that the Earnest Money 
Agreement somehow expired or was abrogated by the parties. 
Even if that is so, the Earnest Money Agreement could still be 
valid for the sole purpose of satisfying the Statute of Frauds. 
That exact issue was faced in the case of Carey v. McGinnis, 
321 P.2d 626 (N.Mex. 1956). 
In that case the broker had an oral agreement to sell 
real estate. An earnest money agreement was signed between 
buyer and seller. The earnest money agreement contained a 
reference to brokerage commissions. The broker contended that 
the agreement was a sufficient memorandum to take the transaction 
outside of the statute. The defendant contended that the property 
was never sold and that the earnest money agreement was a nullity. 
The court responded that: 
It is immaterial as between the plaintiffs 
and the defendant that no enforceable 
contract was ever consummated between 
the owner and the prospective purchaser. 
The fact remains that defendants' 
written binder contained all the 
essential terms and conditions 
of their agreement with the plain-
tiffs, including the commission to 
be paid and to whom. The instru-
ment is signed by both the defendants 
and the plaintiffs. It is a 'memo-
randum or note* meeting fully the 
foregoing statute [of frauds]. 
321 P.2d at 627-26. 
I. The Identity of the Broker Was Well Understood By All 
Parties. 
The Earnest Money Agreement does not identify plaintiffs 
Mel Trimble Realty or Cal Florence as the broker. However, that is 
not fatal. As stated by the Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia: 
The absence in the contract of the 
name of the broker is not fatal to his 
claim. There was only one broker 
associated with the transaction .... 
Moran v. Audette, 217 A.2d 653, 
654 (1966). 
J. Utah Cases Generally Support Plaintiffs' Claim Under 
the Statute of Frauds. 
The Utah case most nearly in point is Ney v. Harrison, 
5 Utah 2d 217, 299 P.2d 1114 (1956). In that case the court 
was faced with an identical issue—that is, whether notations 
on an earnest money agreement constituted a sufficient memorandum 
to take the contract outside the statute of frauds. 
In Ney at 218, the court held that the following 
language satisfied the Statute of Frauds: 
The seller agrees in consideration 
of the efforts of the agent in procuring 
a purchaser, to pay said agent a commission 
equal to the minimum recommended by the 
Salt Lake Real Estate Board. In the event 
seller has entered into a listing contract 
with any other agent and said contract is 
presently effective, this paragraph will be 
of no force and effect. 
* * * 
Wasatch Homes is to receive a commission 
of 2 1/2% which is Total Commission. 
The court then went on to explain its analysis: 
We are cognizant that decisions of 
courts have varied widely as to the 
sufficiency of writings which will suffice 
to meet the Statute of Frauds. Many of 
the decisions are explainable on the 
basis of substantial differences in the 
statutory provisions and terminologies, 
and in factual distinctions. But the 
explanation of other decisions lies only 
in which of the two policies implicit 
in the statute the particular court 
felt was paramount: The protection os 
the landowner from the imposition of 
spurious claims by real estate brokers, 
or the necessity of protecting the broker, 
who has rendered a bona fide service, 
from being refused just compensation 
for his work by the landowner. 
In assaying whether the particular 
writing meets the requirements of our 
Statute, the problem is considerably 
simplified if we carefully observe that 
pur statuteT unlike that of many states, 
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which evidences the contract. (Emphasis 
£dded. ) 
5 Utah 2d 217, 299 P.2d 1114 
fifteen years later our Supreme Court suggested by 
way of dictum that an earnest money agreement might satisfy 
the Statute of Frauds even if the name of the broker and the 
amount of the commission were omitted. Richards v. Hodson, 
26 Utah 2d"113, 485 P.2d 1044 (1971). 
Other Utah cases in non-broker matters have taken 
a similar view. In the case of Peterson v. Hendricks, 524 P.2d 
321, the plaintiff sought to enforce an oral agreement. The 
parol contract was admittedly within the Statute of Frauds. 
However, plaintiff produced certain letters which were claimed 
to be a sufficient memorandum to take the case outside of the 
statute. In that case the letters were very sketchy. Plaintiff 
relied upon the following letter to take the promise outside 
the Statute of Frauds: 
I think we should go ahead as fast 
as possible on a government loan, however, 
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if Slim gets the necessary noney to 
reach our objective .... 
... Then if we hit and form a 
company. If there is only two of us 
then you shall have a half interest 
and myself a half interest «... We 
don't have anything yet going in order 
to form a company, and I know I trust 
you and you trust me, but keep this 
letter as a legal paper because this 
is written down in my handwriting and 
everyone wants something written down 
spelling out their interest. Once we 
can really start mining I think it will 
make us well off and it might make us 
rich. Until then, we will have to keep 
plugging away. 
Note that the letter only talked about a possible agreement in 
the future "... if we hit and form a company." The court 
expressly noted that: 
[T]hese letters do not precisely 
set forth the agreement nor do 
they describe the claim .... 
Nevertheless the Utah Supreme Court held that they were a 
"sufficient" memo to satisfy the statute. In this case the 
Earnest Money Agreement (Exhibit "A") is far more complete and 
detailed than the memo approved in Peterson. 
In summary, plaintiffs suggest that there is no 
mechanical formulae which the court can apply to determine 
whether any given note or memorandum will satisfy the Statute 
of Frauds. However, Utah courts have generally followed the 
spirit of Williston on Contracts § 567A that: 
Therefore, if after a consideration of 
the surrounding circumstances, the 
pertinent facts and all the evidence 
in a particular case, the court concludes 
that enforcement of the agreement will 
not subject the defendant to fraudulent 
claims, the purpose of the Statute will 
best be served by holding the note or 
memorandum sufficient even though it 
be ambiguous or incomplete. 
DATED this 11th day of September, 19 79. 
ROBERT J. DE BRY 
VALDEN P. LIVINGSTON 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
2040 East 4800 South, Suite 203 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Telephone: (801) 276-4439 
not an appropriate deLense when ten undelying contract is 
» i u n p 1 «• t <•(!. 
Thus, in light o£ facts supporting the allegation of a 
sufficient written memorandum and of a fully executed contract, 
defendants' motion to dismissed based on the Statute of Frauds 
should not be granted. At the very least, plaintiff is entitled 
to havr the Coin l consider t ho i«sue interpreting J.acts most 
tn vol able to plaintili's claim. 
POINT III 
DEFENDANTS HEREIN WERE NOT 
INDISPENSABLE PARTIES TO THE 
PRIOR CASE AND PLAINTIFF SHOULD 
NOT BE PROHIBITED FROM BRINGING 
A .SUBSEQUENT ACTION AGAINST THEM 
Deiendantii argue in their Statement of Points and 
Authorities in Support of Their Motion to Dismiss that these 
defendants must be considered "indispensable parties" to the 
prior action and that plaintiff has waived his right to bring a 
subsequent action against them, having failed to join them 
previously. 
However, defendants1 agrument fails for the reason that had 
the defendants truly been "indispensable" to the prior action, 
the court would have been unable to resolve the issues without 
thier joinder. Inasmuch as the court could resolve the issues in 
their absence, their joinder was not required. Rule 19 of the1 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is instructive on the issue ofi 
"indispensable parties". 
These defendants would appear to be proper but not necessary 
parties with the effect that failure of their joinder in the: 
previous car.c would not preclude action against them now, but 
only with the effect that the prior judment would not affect 
their rights and liabilities. 
POINT IV 
QUANTUM MERUIT IS A PROPER REMEDY 
IN THIS CASE ON THE THEORY OF SALE 
OK f.KCURITIES 
Plaintiff's Complaint includes an alternative cause of 
action based upon quantum meruit for compensation for services 
performed in connection with the sale of the stock of Monte Vista 
Kanch, Inc. i'luni uliran and ohlers to Fitzgerald. This Second 
already submitted in this case. In this case, plaintiff has 
indicated that a sufficient memorandum exists in the form of 
defendant Wallace Ohran's in-court admission of the existence and 
terms of the contract. 
Plaintiff's prior Statement of Points and Authorities 
pointed out several authorities for this position, but further 
authority is found in the case of the Estate of Meledandri, 
437 N.Y. Supp. 2d 996 (1981). In addition, statements made by a 
defendant in depositions may satisfy the Statute of Frauds. 
URSA Farmers Cooperative Co. v. Trent, 58 111. App. 3d 930, 374 
N.E. 2d 1123 (1978); Young v. Tuck, 178 S.W. 2d 86 (Tenn. 1943); 
Huffine v. McCampbell, 149 Tenn. 47, 257 S.W. 80 (1923). 
Also, in this case the parties partially executed the 
contract. The only unexecuted part of the contract was payment 
to the plaintiff. This partial execution acts as an exception to 
the Statute of Frauds. 
POINT III 
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO RELIEF 
UNDER QUANTUM MERUIT 
In this case, a sale of securities (the stock and assets of 
defendant Monte Vista Ranch) may allow the plaintiff, as agent, 
to recover in quantum meruit for its time and expenses involved 
in arranging the sale. Such recovery is not precluded by the 
Young case cited by defendants. 
POINT IV 
PLAINTIFF MAY BRING THIS 
ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANTS HEREIN 
Defendants argue that plaintiff should have sued the defen-
dants in the prior action. Perhaps it would have been 
appropriate for plaintiff to name the defendants in the prior 
action. However, it is a time honored rule of lav; that a 
plaintiff is entitled to his day in court and should not be 
denied an opportunity to be heard so long as he follows proper 
procedures. Any joinder of the defendants in the prior action 
